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PUSH, PULL, AND SPILL:
A TRANSDISCIPLINARY CASE STUDY IN
MUNICIPAL OPEN GOVERNMENT
Jan Whittington, Ryan Calo, Mike Simon, Jesse Woo,
Meg Young & Peter Schmiedeskamp†

ABSTRACT
Municipal open data raises hopes and concerns. The activities of cities produce a wide
array of data, data that is vastly enriched by ubiquitous computing. Municipal data is
opened as it is pushed to, pulled by, and spilled to the public through online portals,
requests for public records, and releases by cities and their vendors, contractors, and
partners. By opening data, cities hope to raise public trust and prompt innovation.
Municipal data, however, is often about the people who live, work, and travel in the city.
By opening data, cities raise concern for privacy and social justice.
This article presents the results of a broad empirical exploration of municipal data
release in the City of Seattle. In this research, parties affected by municipal practices
expressed their hopes and concerns for open data. City personnel from eight prominent
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departments described the reasoning, procedures, and controversies that have accompanied
their release of data. All of the existing data from the online portal for the city were joined
to assess the risk to privacy inherent in open data. Contracts with third parties involving
sensitive or confidential data about residents of the city were examined for safeguards
against the unauthorized release of data.
Results suggest the need for more comprehensive measures to manage the risk latent
in opening city data. Cities should maintain inventories of data assets, produce data
management plans pertaining to the activities of departments, and develop governance
structures to deal with issues as they arise—centrally and amongst the various
departments—with ex ante and ex post protocols to govern the push, pull, and spill of data.
In addition, cities should consider conditioned access to pushed data, conduct audits and
training around public records requests, and develop standardized model contracts to
protect against the spill of data by third parties.
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INTRODUCTION

Cities hold considerable information, including details about the daily
lives of residents and employees, maps of critical infrastructure, and records
of internal deliberations. Cities are beginning to realize that this
information has economic and civic value. The responsible release of city
information can result in greater efficiency and innovation in the public and
private sector. New services are cropping up that leverage open city data to
great effect.1 Activist groups and residents are also placing increasing
pressure on state and local government to be more transparent.
There has been little research into the growing area of municipal open
data.2 Cities are beginning to open their data in a way that has never been
seen before, and these releases may raise privacy concerns. Scholarly and
media attention has focused at the federal level toward the activities of the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
and the White House.3 Despite the attention given to federal agencies, most
personally-identifiable data is collected much closer to home, by the
governments of the cities where we live, work, and play.4
1. See, e.g., Kathleen Hickey, AppStore Gives Governments Access to Municipal Apps,
GCN (June 4, 2014), http://gcn.com/articles/2014/06/04/granicus-appstore.aspx; Angus
Loten, Entrepreneurs Shape Free Data into Money, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9 2014; Jason Slotkin,
City Living: There’s an App for That, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan 11, 2013), http://www
.computerworld.com/article/2494114/mobile-wireless/city-living--there-s-an-app-for-that
.html; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Apps Pave Way for City Services, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704658204575611143577864882.
2. For example, Maxat Kassen has observed:
[I]t is not yet clear how the potential of the open data concept can be
realized at the local level as there has been no analysis of current projects
so far. The concept is still in its infancy, and in fact it gained a political
meaning primarily after the launch of the official U.S. government data
portal in 2009. Later, similar data projects were initiated at the local level.
Maxat Kassen, A promising phenomenon of open data: A case study of the Chicago open data
project, 30 GOV’T INFO. Q. 508, 509 (2013); see also Anneke Zuiderwijk & Marijn Janssen,
Open Data Policies, Their Implementation and Impact: A Framework for Comparison, 31
GOV’T INFO. Q. 17, 17 (2014) (“[V]ery little systematic and structured research has been
done on the issues that are covered by open data policies, their intent and actual impact.
Furthermore, no suitable framework for comparing open data policies is available.”). As
recently as 2011, the International City/County Management Agency national survey of
e-Government did not include questions on open data. Donald F. Norris & Christopher
G. Reddick, Local E-Government in the United States: Transformation or Incremental
Change?, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 165–175.
3. E.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The
FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
4. See generally Bill Schrier, Chapter 28: Toads on the Road to Open Government Data,
in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN
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This Article is a cross-disciplinary assessment of an open municipal
government system. We are a team of researchers in law, computer science,
information science, and urban planning that worked hand-in-hand with
the City of Seattle, Washington to understand its current procedures
around data processing from each of our disciplinary perspectives. Based on
this empirical work, we have generated a set of recommendations to help
the city manage risk latent in opening its data.
Seattle makes for a great case study. With a population of 650,000 and
growing rapidly, Seattle is mid-sized, but not so enormous as to be
unwieldy. It is a highly educated, technically savvy city and is often highly
ranked among its peers on measures of innovation, creativity, and
technology.5 Seattle was one of the first cities to embrace an open data
initiative.6 Its leadership has publicly stated a need to achieve a balance
between privacy and transparency.7 During our research, we found
encouraging signs in what Seattle is already doing and its willingness to
adopt best practices, and identified areas for additional improvement.
A.

THE MUNICIPALITY IN FOCUS

Municipalities govern a wide array of activities, from police services to
building permits to parks and recreational services and facilities. City
governments collect and process large amounts of information to support
these activities, often with the help of third party contractors. Some of this
data is confidential, requiring special handling for security purposes, while
other is not confidential, but nevertheless contains sensitive details about
residents and employees. If taken out of context or made publicly available,
this data could bring about harms to privacy or social equity.
Rapid technological changes pose significant complications for
municipalities seeking to govern data in the public interest. Municipalities
are eager to become “smart cities” by adopting information technologies

PRACTICE 305, 305–313 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma, eds., 2010); Kassen, supra note
2, at 509; Peter Conradie & Sunil Choenni, On the barriers for local government releasing
open data, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. S10, S10–17 (2014).
5. E.g., Boyd Cohen, The 10 Smartest Cities In North America, CO.EXIST (Nov. 14,
2013, 7:08 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3021592/the-10-smartest-cities-in-north
-america.
6. Press Release, Socrata, Inc., Socrata Strengthens Open Data Market Leadership
(Jun. 28, 2011), http://www.socrata.com/newsroom-article/socrata-strengthens-open
-data-market-leadership.
7. Press Release, City of Seattle Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches
Digital Privacy Initiative (Nov. 3, 2014), http://murray.seattle.gov/city-of-seattle-launches
-digital-privacy-initiative.
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that promise more effective and efficient delivery of services.8 Ubiquitous
computing includes mobile micro-video cameras, utility meters that discern
the use of appliances, and technologies for detecting and tracking residents’
whereabouts, energy use, and other information. Each of these technologies
has the potential to create real-time, continuous data feeds. As the
technologies of data collection, processing, and storage become ever more
advanced and potentially intrusive, local governments face the challenge of
adapting policies and guidance about privacy and social equity to changing
circumstances. In the absence of clear criteria and procedures, municipal
agents may resort to ad hoc decision-making. In a federated system of
governance, the cumulative implications of multiple data releases may have
consequences not anticipated by any individual unit, including the ability to
reconstruct the identity of an anonymous resident.
The data generated by municipalities is of interest to many commercial
entities, which seek to use the data for purposes that are not necessarily
aligned with the public interest. In March 2014, the FTC published a report
introducing the data-broker industry, which is built around the collecting,
processing and reselling of data about individuals.9 Brokers aggregate data
from public and private sources, index the data into detailed profiles of
persons, households, and neighborhoods, and sell it to private and public
buyers. Eight of the nine data brokers participating in the FTC study
reportedly relied on information supplied by government to identify and
profile individuals.10
B.

PURPOSE, THEMES, AND CONTENT

Our research explored both the mechanisms and consequences of
municipal data releases. Our results provide a snapshot of activities and their
8. See generally Michael Batty, Smart Cities, Big Data, 39 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN.
& DESIGN, 191 (2012); Rob Kitchin, The Real-Time City? Big Data And Smart Urbanism,
79 GEOJOURNAL 1 (2014); Mike Weston, ‘Smart Cities’ Will Know Everything About You:
How Can Marketers Cash In Without Becoming Enemies of the People?, WALL ST. J., July 12,
2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-cities-will-know-everything-about-you1436740596. Weston writes:
[M]unicipalities and governments across the world are pledging billions to create
“smart cities”—urban areas covered with Internet-connected devices that control
citywide systems, such as transit, and collect data. Although the details can vary, the
basic goal is to create super-efficient infrastructure, aid urban planning and improve
the well-being of the populace.
Id.
9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/
140527databrokerreport.pdf.
10. Id. at 15.
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potential implications in a city that is striving to reap the benefits and avoid
the pitfalls of data release.
Cities share data in three basic ways: push, pull, and spill. Cities “push” data
when they publish databases through online or other portals. Residents and
others “pull” data out of the city with public records requests. And cities
“spill” data, through accidental exposure, malicious data breach, and the
distribution of data by vendors, contractors, and partners. We use the push,
pull, and spill taxonomy as a unifying theme throughout our analysis and
recommendations.
Whether pushed, pulled, or spilled, the release of municipal data has
many consequences. Three questions guided our exploration of the
consequences of municipal data releases. Does the availability of open data
increase public trust in the effective and efficient delivery of public services?
Under what technological, legal, and other circumstances can municipalities
govern the release of open data to meet the public need for privacy? What
harms could municipal open data lead to, including issues of disparate racial
or social impact, physical insecurity, or harm to consumers or the
marketplace? We approach these questions across multiple methods and
sections of this Article.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows: We discuss our specific
approach to investigating the city’s use of municipal data in Part II. Part III
summarizes our findings. Part IV consists of seven recommendations for
Seattle—and other cities interested in improving open data practices. We
recommend: (1) conducting an inventory of data assets, (2) requesting each
department to submit a data management plan, (3) establishing nested
governance structures to deal with issues as they arise, (4) establishing ex
ante and ex post protocols for push, pull, and spill, (5) conducting an audit
and training around public records requests, (6) exploring the prospect of
conditioned access to some city data, and (7) developing a standardized
model contract for data vendors. We understand that Seattle is actively
pursuing some or all of these recommendations even as of this writing.
Finally, the Article closes with Part V outlining future work suggested by
our analysis and findings.
II.

OUR APPROACH

There is little empirical work on municipal open data practices to date.
However, exploratory research is not without guideposts. A sophisticated
and expanding literature investigates the private sector’s use of information
technology. This literature builds theoretical and empirical accounts and
examines how those uses may compromise social norms and features of the
economy; features that are prefaced upon the privacy of personal
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information, racial and social equity, and the preservation of the public trust
in digital or online transactions.11 This Article seeks to begin a similar line
of research aimed at the public sector, starting with municipalities. As
subjects of research, municipalities are recent entrants into an ongoing,
multidisciplinary conversation about the benefits and pitfalls of data
collection, use, release, retention, commercialization, and security. This
characterization is especially apt when the aim of research is to orient policy
to the public interest.
As the subject of this particular study is municipal open data, we focus
on the release of data by or from municipalities.12 The push, pull, and spill
taxonomy assisted us in designing research that would explore current
practices while highlighting the potential future effects of such practices on
public trust, privacy, and social equity. This required a mixture of research
methods, each suited to a likely area of contest or hazard.
Our research methods and findings are described in four parts:
 Qualitative Assessment 1—Key Stakeholders:
We begin with a sense of the hopes and concerns of the
parties affected by municipal practices. For this, we
carried out focus groups on the topic of pushed, pulled
and spilled municipal data, with several types of key
stakeholders in the Seattle community. We relay our
findings.
 Qualitative Assessment 2—The City:
We then discuss how Seattle itself handles data. We
conducted interviews with city personnel involved in the
release of data. Interviews spanned push, pull and spill:
the intended purpose and use of open data by
departments, the circumstances of public disclosure
requests, and the involvement of departments in
11. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and
Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24 (2010),
https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_cacm10.pdf; Alessandro Acquisti & Jens
Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY &
PRIVACY, 26 (2005); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Ryan Calo, Digital Market
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan
Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 606 (2014).
12. Other stages in the lifecycle of data matter and, though not central to this study,
are just as worthy of research. The results of this study suggest promising future avenues
for research in these related areas, including, for example, the potential for upstream
decisions about collection and retention to be predicated on the downstream effectiveness
of policies restricting the uses of data.
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contracts with third parties for information-intensive
services. The results indicate the types of data collected
and used, the incentives that departments have to release
datasets (or not), and the ways in which releases are
modified to preserve privacy and social justice.
 Technical Assessment—Open Data Analysis:
We conducted technical analyses of the datasets already
pushed to the City’s open data portal in order to
understand how the City uses the portal and to
investigate the extent to which the City’s current
practices could potentially compromise privacy and
social justice.
 Legal Assessment—Vendor Contracts:
Having identified, in departmental interviews, many
contracts with third parties involving sensitive or
confidential data about residents of the city, we
examined these contracts for the kinds of safeguards one
might expect in order to prevent, for example,
unauthorized spills of this data.
As a collection of exploratory assessments, these research activities
provide a broad array of insights into the role of the municipality in the
release of data.
III.

FINDINGS

This part of the Article presents extensive findings on how a city
generates and releases municipal data. This is a vast area for research. As
other authors have explained, government departments are created to
perform services that markets do not or should not provide, or are difficult
or impossible for residents to provide for themselves.13 For example,
municipalities organize to provide regulatory functions to curb the many
ways in which the for-profit, self-interested incentive structure of the
private sector will “as if by an invisible hand” lead markets to fail to serve
the public interest.14 Within their jurisdiction, municipalities operate
monopoly or monopolistic markets for several goods (e.g., water, electricity,
roads, lighting), which are often provided through contracts with firms on
behalf of residents. In negotiating these contracts, municipalities have
13. See Shrier, supra note 4, at 311.
14. See id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF THE NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776)).
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substantial leverage on the public’s behalf, reducing the transaction costs
that would have accrued if members of the public were left to organize and
bargain on their own.15 This bargaining power makes cities powerful market
players—an untapped source of influence over privacy and security policy,
as we discuss below. Municipalities also provide intergovernmental
coordination: the geospatial area or jurisdiction of any given municipality is
layered with the jurisdictions of several other governmental entities (e.g.,
special districts, counties, states, and the federal government). With such
eclectic aims, municipalities can appear to be labyrinths of data production
and release, bewildering in their complexity.
As a consequence of the enormity of the research task—as well as the
inherent subjectivity in terms such as “open” or sensitive—we were forced
to make certain assumptions and choices that we try to highlight through
our findings. We also lay out an agenda for future work that reflects the
realization that there is much more to do. Nevertheless, we attempted to
convey and engage with both the breadth and depth of city data in our
analysis.
Unlike physical assets, in Seattle as in many other cities, there is no
central catalog of datasets and metadata. This research was conducted in
partnership with the City of Seattle. The participation of departments in
interviews and in the collection of key documents was critical to the success
of this research in depicting, in situ, the governance of municipal open data.
A.

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT I: KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Though our subject is municipal data, our backdrop is the people it
affects. This section discusses our qualitative analysis of stakeholders’
perceptions of open municipal data, particularly its downstream impacts.
We understand that cities want to be responsive to their constituents, and
15. As Ronald Coase explains, illustrating with the case of the harmful effects suffered
by many from the smoke exhaust of a factory:
[D]irect governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results
than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm. But
equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in
economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is
normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are
involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem
through the market or the firm may be high.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960). On the
application of Coase’s theory to privacy harm through transactions with personal
information, see generally, Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 11, and Jan Whittington
& Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1331 n.9 (2012).
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we endeavored to gain a sense of the hopes and fears of residents and others
around open municipal data. We designed the research question for this
component to be open-ended and as inclusive as possible of the range of
issues that stakeholders may find relevant to the initiative. Through focus
groups and interviews, we asked users for their hopes, concerns, and
expectations for Seattle’s open data initiative.
1. Methods: Data Collection and Analysis
a) Research Design and Sampling
The data collection for this study included the following stakeholder
groups: (1) Seattle residents in general, (2) civic hackers, (3) privacy
activists, (4) city employees, (5) an academic, (6) a legal advocate, and (7)
industry representatives.16 Our hope was to talk to those who directly use or
would potentially use open municipal data, as well as those who work on
closely related issues. Thus, with the exception of the group of “residents in
general,” respondents were largely familiar with the topic at the time of the
focus groups and interviews.17
Seattle’s local tech economy offers unique access to major industrial
players, tech hobbyists, and activists. Data collection for this study was
conducted with these existing organizations. For example, the “civic
hackers” focus group was conducted with a local hobbyists group which
meets weekly to build apps of local interest using open data. The focus
group with privacy activists was conducted with members of a community
activist organization focused on privacy issues, like the use of police
surveillance cameras. The four industry representatives interviewed came
from relevant departments in three large local corporations.
Most sampling for the study was purposive, based on respondent
membership in relevant organizations or interest in the study.18 Civic
hackers, privacy activists, the legal advocate, academic, and industry
representatives were contacted directly for their relevance to the study.
16. We adopt the Value Sensitive Design definition of stakeholders: “Direct
stakeholders refer to parties—individuals or organizations—who interact directly with the
computer system or its output. Indirect stakeholders refer to all other parties who are
affected by the use of the system. Often, indirect stakeholders are ignored in the design
process.” Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Jr. & Alan Borning, Value Sensitive Design and
Information Systems, in EARLY ENGAGEMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: OPENING UP
THE LABORATORY 55, 73 (2013).
17. We used a focus group format to collect data from the first four stakeholder types
listed. Due to scheduling constraints, data from a legal advocate, academic, and industry
representatives was based on interviews.
18. As part of the University of Washington Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval for this study, demographic information about respondents was not collected.
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Members of the general public were recruited via fliers and Craigslist.19 Our
hope for the city employees focus group was to speak with workers on the
“front-line”—police, fire, waste management, and others who drive fleet
vehicles; constraints within the city made this infeasible. The city employees
who participated were largely administrative staff; nevertheless, this group
was more sensitive to potential privacy issues than we had expected.
b) Data Collection
Data collection for this study was based on focus groups and interviews.
The focus group format was piloted twice to make it more neutral. Each
focus group had 7–10 members and lasted 60–120 minutes. We used this
format for residents, privacy advocates, civic hackers, and city employees.20
Focus groups are well-suited for understanding unobservable phenomena
like attitudes.21 As a method, focus groups present a risk of respondent bias
and group-think; our research design took measures to minimize these
risks.22
Focus groups began with a 10-minute introduction from the moderator
covering relevant background information. The moderator introduced the
city’s open data portal, the types of data currently available on it, and data
types that the city has made available. The moderator introduced the
Washington State Public Records Act (PRA), and its strong value on
government transparency.23 The PRA is a state law that establishes broad
rights for state residents to request public records. It is intended to promote
government transparency and accountability. The moderator explained that
while the PRA requires the reactive release of data in light of a public
disclosure request, open data is proactively released and not mandated. The
presentation discussed how data is anonymized by removing its identifying

19. This group was compensated $15 for their time. No other respondent was
compensated. Perhaps because of this means of recruitment, respondents for the general
public group happened to be people experiencing instability in employment and housing.
20. In addition, we also interviewed four industry representatives, a legal advocate,
and an academic.
21. For a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of focus groups as a
research method see DAVID L. MORGAN, FOCUS GROUPS AS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
13–17 (2d ed. 1996).
22. See Jenny Kitzinger, Qualitative Research. Introducing Focus Groups, 311 BRIT.
MED. J., 299–30 (1995) (“The method is particularly useful for exploring people’s
knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but
how they think and why they think that way.”). See generally Jenny Kitzinger, The
Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction Between Research Participants, 16
SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 103 (1994).
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2011) (Public Records Act).
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attributes, and under what circumstances data subjects may be re-identified,
if any. Focus groups were conducted with a minimal moderation approach.24
c) Data Analysis
Transcripts of the focus groups and interviews were analyzed via
qualitative coding. The first round of coding used a priori codes based on
our research questions. The second round of coding used open and axial
coding, in keeping with a grounded theory approach.25 Analysis was
conducted using NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software.26 Using this
tool, the researcher tags blocks of text with a theme. Based on these tags,
the software creates a database of quotes indexed by theme and respondent
group. Iterative, inductive coding was formalized as a coding manual, by
which data analysis was standardized across respondent groups. In keeping
with a grounded theoretic approach, the following results are closely derived
from the data.
The results of the stakeholder analysis offered a range of perceptions on
the downstream impact of open data. Due to the exploratory, open-ended
nature of this study, the analysis covered a broad scope of hopes, concerns
and expectations about who will use the data, and to what end. Issues related
to public trust, privacy, race, and social justice were of core interest to this
work. Additional topics, like safety, commercial actors, and legal issues also
emerged in the analysis. In this section, we discuss results by theme, and
offer a sense of the inter-group variation on a given issue.

24. Respondents were told that the central goal of the session was to hear as many of
their hopes and concerns as possible. Three themes—public trust, privacy, and race and
social justice—were of particular interest to this project. Rather than prompting these
themes directly, the moderator waited to see if they arose naturally from the conversation.
If any of these topics were not addressed, the moderator made a note of this, then directly
addressed remaining themes at the end of the session.
25. Qualitative coding is an interpretive process of systematically analyzing a text to
surface themes within it. A priori codes are themes that the researcher brings to the text.
A grounded theory approach necessitates that these themes arise from the text itself. Open
coding is the initial process of capturing each theme from a text; axial coding combines
these open codes into groups. For background on these coding methods, see generally Juliet
Corbin & Anselm Strauss, Strategies for Qualitative Data Analysis, in BASICS OF
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING
GROUNDED THEORY 85 (4th ed. 2014).
26. See What is NVio, QSR INT’L, http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo
(last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
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2. Findings
a) Effects of Open Data Initiative on Public Trust
Respondents’ primary hope for open data was that it would increase
transparency in government. Every group touched on this sentiment,
although the form it took varied. This included hopes for greater
transparency, the democratization of governance, and the hope to build a
better society through data-driven policy decisions. Government
accountability was of keen interest to those in five of the seven stakeholder
groups. This was expressed in many forms, from oversight on police or
prison guard actions, to residents fact-checking politicians by looking at the
same raw data. Some groups, like the civic hackers, presented this hope with
conviction: “Having the data be open is an incredible source of
accountability. It is a key to democracy.”27 This group spoke in-depth about
opportunities for widespread data-literacy, which was viewed as a key
intermediate step to true accountability. Others, especially privacy
advocates, and residents in general, held similar hopes while also more
ambivalent; we outline these concerns further on.
b) Economic Value Latent in Data
A commonly stated goal for open data is that it can bolster the local
economy. Stakeholders—including industry representatives, privacy
activists, and civic hackers—shared this goal. Some focused on ways open
data can foster new companies and lead to more jobs, or allow existing
companies to offer new products. Industry representatives were interested
in ways that commercial actors improve the quality of data as they use it,
and cited the potential for a “two-way pipe,” by which companies could add
value to the data—e.g., with real-time data feeds—and give it back to the
city.28 One industry representative said data could be used to target their
marketing: “How do you find out which customers are heavy commuters?
You just ask the city for all the tapes about license plates.”29 Privacy activists
and hackers said that businesses could help interpret and make the data
more usable to everyday people. However, one privacy activist thought that
while analysis and usability was a valuable role for businesses, it constituted
a public good that should not be delegated to private actors. Civic hackers
were hopeful that open data could help smaller, more agile companies
replace large firms in government procurement.

27. Focus Group, Civic Hacker Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 12, 2015).
28. Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #2 (Mar. 27, 2015).
29. Telephone interview, industry representative #1 (Mar. 27, 2015).
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c) City Management of Open Data Initiative
Stakeholders asserted a range of expectations for the city in how they
proceed with the open data initiative. Every group stated that the data
should be anonymized prior to release. In keeping with the spirit of the
PRA, there was also a strong conviction that data held by government
belonged to the public. The groups who most used this data, like industry
representatives, privacy activists and civic hackers, had specific input for the
way the data is and should be stored, accessed, formatted, licensed and
released. These groups stated that the license terms under which the data
was released should be clearer. The legal advocate and academic shared the
expectation that the city should limit data collection, and limit its use
beyond that for which it was collected. Despite potential risks, civic hackers
and privacy advocates were profoundly opposed to the idea of access
restrictions, fearing that they would be used against someone with
legitimate interest in the data. Often, the scope of this conversation moved
into one about the city as a data custodian: its data storage, retention, and
deletion processes.
Multiple groups shared a sense of unease about the city’s ability to
prevent data spill.30 This concern was echoed by members of the general
public, who were acutely concerned about hacking and identity theft. Both
industry and city employees said that the city’s servers are regularly targeted
by Chinese hackers and other international actors. As we discuss further on,
both the general public and city employees were concerned that hacked data
would be used to threaten critical infrastructure.
There was large variation within and between groups on the feasibility
of use restrictions on the data, with an overall sense that restrictions would
not be enforceable. Civic hackers and privacy activists noted the practical
problems with governing uses of data once it is made open. The legal
advocate pointed out that some forms of use restrictions would represent
unconstitutional restraints of free speech. Even in the absence of formal use
restrictions, industry representatives were sensitive to the way the public

30. One industry representative said:
They need to follow reasonable baseline data security practices,
particularly if the city is going to be a repository of big data. And, if forprofit companies in the health-care sector, for example, have underinvested in data security, then it’s a fair bit to say the IT systems of many
municipal governments aren’t where they should be either.
Id.
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would react to different uses.31 Public-facing organizations, as opposed to
organizations that work business-to-business, were thought to use public
feedback as a check on data uses. The legal advocate shared this sense,
adding that data brokers and less visible actors are less responsive to norms
around data use: “Is anyone really comfortable with the variety of awful
things that have happened with commercial actors in this space—like
companies creating extortion schemes by posting photos of people online
that they get via public records?”32 While use restrictions were generally
deemed infeasible, this quote illustrates the ambivalence stakeholders
expressed about unintended consequences of data release.
d) Privacy Interests in Open Data
Privacy implications of the open data initiative were a prominent feature
in every conversation, with the exception of the civic hackers group. Some
respondents among the general public and civic hackers asserted that
“privacy is an illusion.”33 Members of these groups strongly believed a data
spill was liable to happen eventually. However, they were less concerned
about privacy implications than they were that public outcry would slow the
momentum of the open data initiative. Civic hackers framed concerns about
privacy as important, but coeval with concerns about data inaccuracy and
misinterpretation. Overall, this group shared an impetus to get “more eyes
on more data”34—data in anonymized form. Some respondents in the
privacy activist group shared the civic hackers’ confidence that data
31. One representative said, “We’re very conscious of ethics and big data, civil rights
and big data, and trying to be really thoughtful about how we combine data so that it isn’t
used in bad ways or identifies people.” Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #3
(Mar. 27, 2015). Similarly, another industry representative said:
[I]t could be useful for commercial benefit if you’re doing that in a deidentified or aggregated way, and that shouldn’t be a problem. If you’re
doing it in a personally identifiable way—so the people can add factors
to your behavioral profile—that’s probably going to rub people the wrong
way.
Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #1 (Mar. 27, 2015).
32. Interview, Legal Advocate, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 19, 2015).
33. Focus Group, Civic Hacker Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 12, 2015). One
civic hacker said:
I think that banks and private health care are a much bigger concern for
privacy problems than the government; they’re a lot more focused.
[Governments have] bits and pieces of data all over the place, you’d have
to really want to aggregate that stuff in order to really drill down in
somebody’s privacy.
Id.
34. Id.
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anonymization processes are resilient to reverse re-identification. Members
of the general public and the legal advocate were less confident that data
anonymization could protect individuals.
Other stakeholders had more acute privacy concerns. There was a
general sense that the city had sensitive data. A privacy advocate said, “I fear
the efforts to make data available about the government actually makes data
available about the public.”35 The category of what information is or should
be “private” varied between groups. Members of the general public framed
private data as social security numbers and information related to financial
status (e.g., credit rating). An industry representative and civic hackers
emphasized that locational data would be a privacy concern, if released in a
granular way. The legal advocate favored an approach that would scrutinize
any data type as one piece of a larger mosaic: “If it’s a sufficient analysis, it’s
also going to take into account whether this information, when correlated
with other data that is available, presents harms.”36 The legal advocate spoke
to ways that data could be re-identified; thus, he said that entire record types
should be considered sensitive (e.g., police video) and exempt from
proactive release or most forms of public records request.
City employees’ discussion of what constitutes private information was
broader than that of other groups, due in part to the large amount of
information the city has in their personnel files. Employees described the
different standards of privacy that applied to them as public employees.
They recalled the shock of adjusting to having their salaries posted publicly.
Members of the group were unaware of whether certain data types were
protected from public records request under the PRA, for example, home
address, employee benefits, and retirement information. These respondents
were also very concerned about the release of insurance information such as
the identity of their dependents or other family members.
Multiple respondents within all groups mentioned specific segments of
the population they perceived as having special privacy interests. Several
groups, including the general public and civic hackers, mentioned the
special interests of children and the elderly. One privacy activist said:
It’s a really privileged position to be able to say that everything
should be open. People with experiences of different kinds of
abuse have had to build hiding into their cultural identity—open
is not just going to work for them.37

35. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
36. Interview, Legal Advocate, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 19, 2015).
37. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
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Safety concerns were the primary reason cited for these special privacy
interests.
e) Safety Risks Latent in Data
Concerns about safety were more widely held than we had expected, and
came up in conversations with every group. Respondents were concerned
about the safety of vulnerable populations. There was concern that children,
elderly people, and victims of previous crimes would be specifically targeted
by criminals seeking to assault or con them. These concerns were brought
up widely, in five out of seven groups. The nature of government services
means that those in need will be especially present in the data. One City
employee pointed out ways that police officers’ route information reveals
domestic violence: “you can find safe houses, individuals that are maybe
victims that are being involved in their processes and response patterns.”38
Privacy activists noted that governments also have data on foster children
and those in child protective services.
Multiple respondent groups were concerned with the safety implications
for City employees. First responders were perceived to be at risk of vigilante
justice. A privacy activist said:
People have tried to find out where cops live so they can go to
their houses and do stuff to them. Cops still have personal rights
and personal privacy rights and stuff too, even though we would
default to thinking that they don’t go out of their way to respect
our own.39

This concern for officers’ safety co-existed with the respondent’s other
attitudes about police. City employees even referred to a past PRA request
for police officers’ home addresses that had been granted. They noted that
this incident had led the fire department to take greater precautions with
the kinds of identifying information it included in its reports.40 City
employees also raised the possibility that public data could be used to derive
route patterns, which could be used by criminals to target officers on their
daily routine.
38. Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 9, 2015).
39. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
40. One exchange in this group illustrates these concerns:
You might get incident information, but you’re not going to have the
firefighters’ names because then they’re easily looked up. They’re at
Station X, OK—you can see shift details and stuff, so we have to be smart
about it. Especially the kinds of shifts firefighters are on—they have to
leave their families . . . . They’re on 24 hours.
Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 9, 2015).
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City employees were also concerned about their safety. Some responded
that they felt they could be targeted because of their race or sexual
orientation; one person described a city department’s LGBT group meeting
wherein another city employee tried to use the PRA to request the names
of all attendees. The same person reported feeling outed when trying to
change his or her official marital status.41 Other respondents felt personally
exposed by ways that public records are indexed and searchable on Google.
Safety risks were perceived to implicate not only individuals, but larger
domestic security concerns. Members of the general public, industry
representatives, and city employees referred to the potential for open data
to be used to target critical infrastructure. This risk was framed as applying
to physical infrastructures, like the power grid, as well as servers and other
digital assets. To the extent that open data could be used to derive first
response patterns, city employees were concerned that this information
would be used to divert public safety officers from a planned attack. The
academic cited a counterexample of the public safety utility of open data,
especially public health concerns like vaccine and disease status.
f) Lack of Public Trust in the Management of the Open Data
Initiative
Despite these risks, multiple stakeholder groups were concerned that
the government would not open enough data. Civic hackers, industry
representatives, privacy activists, and members of the general public shared
a concern that open data efforts would fall short of its promise if very little
data were released. Members of the general public and privacy activist
groups shared a sense that those in city government would selectively record
or release data to protect their own image. One privacy activist said, “If the
city . . . maintains the ability to selectively refrain from publishing portions
of that data, then we’re not a whole lot better off than if they just weren’t
publishing in the first place.”42 Respondents in the civic hackers group and
41. This individual responded:
It doesn’t feel safe to me at all. My being, you know as a, being married,
I had to contact a lot of people to get my status change in the city. They
didn’t, you know, so then I’m thinking okay, let’s advertise it even more
to everybody. I was certainly in my right so I’m going to do it, but it’s
pretty public. If I wanted to not tell people I was gay, it would have been
impossible because everybody has access to it.
Id.
42. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
A member of the Seattle residents group said, “This is just something they’re doing to
appease the general public because there’s an outcry in America. But the police is going to
be the police . . . as soon as they get some information they don’t want to be publicized,

1918

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:3

privacy activists were concerned that government actors could edit data, and
raised the importance of using metadata or a data signature or hash that
would verify its authenticity. While the responses of the general public and
privacy activists exhibited low trust in government, civic hackers were more
interested with issues of data quality.
Other groups worried that the promise of open data might become
encumbered. One industry representative thought agencies might lose sight
of the larger goals surrounding open data. He feared open data would
become “a compliance exercise where the agencies and the cities will all do
whatever they have to [do in order to] stop being bothered about it
anymore.”43 This respondent spoke from a sense that unambitious
management of the data would pose a missed opportunity. Both civic
hackers and city employees noted that governments feared exposing
themselves to liability from data release; for the civic hackers, liability and
related concerns were framed as barriers to progress.
g) Perceived Social Justice Implications of Open Data
Respondents perceived open data as having promise for social justice
issues. Half of the groups explicitly mentioned “social justice” issues without
prompting. Even when not referred to explicitly, the implication of open
data on social justice issues was present in respondents’ ideas about
government accountability for misconduct. Other references to social justice
included the possibility of communities using data to advocate for
themselves (civic hackers), data-driven policy (general public and civic
hackers), and crowdsourced service requests (e.g., potholes, streetlight
reports) (industry representatives). While some in the general public group
felt that open data would have positive and incremental social justice
implications, one person thought that little would happen in this vein: “I
think the reality of it is, it’s not going to really affect anybody that’s down
and out anyway in Washington State, it’s only going to affect the . . .
powers-that-be anyway.”44 Racial minorities within the general public group
expressed a sense that open data would not be put to work on their behalf.
Other groups raised concerns that open data could have negative racial
and social justice implications. Many of these were related to the potential
that commercial uses of the data would have a disproportionate impact on
marginalized communities. One member of the privacy activists said, “I fear
there’s going to be a glitch in it.” Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar.
19, 2015).
43. Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #4 (Apr. 6, 2015).
44. Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 19, 2015).
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that it would be used to lower property values, redline insurance, et cetera,
in neighborhoods with high crime rates rather than addressing those issues.
I’m worried that data about precincts where people don’t vote much could
lead politicians to write them off.”45 A member of the general public group
spoke to the ways that data, once open, is copied and persists:
The information they put on there is a detriment to me because
I’ve been trying to get, well I just got out. I was released from a
penitentiary and I’ve been trying to get work and anytime they do
a background check it’s bringing up shit from like 1996. This is
2015.46

Taken together, these responses highlight how uses for open data could
reify existing social marginalization.
3. Implications of Stakeholder Assessment
The open-ended nature of the qualitative stakeholder assessment
resulted in some findings that we might have expected, some opinions that
were more widely shared than we would have expected, and some surprises.
For the purpose of our recommendations, we foreground the following
results: (1) Multiple groups expressed concern regarding privacy risks latent
in the data, especially to vulnerable and marginalized populations and city
employees. Not all stakeholders were confident that anonymization would
be enough to protect those listed in the data, although each stakeholder
listed strong anonymization as an expectation for the city. (2) Stakeholder
groups spoke to positive economic impacts from commercial uses of the
data, but drew a clear line between these uses and those that were considered
overly intrusive. Members of the general public were aware of threats to
privacy from data brokers, which the research team did not expect. (3) City
employees did not know what aspects of their personal data were protected,
and they did not feel safe. (4) In thinking about open data, many groups
spoke more broadly about issues of data custodianship; in their eyes the
city’s responsibility to protect its data and to open it intertwined. (5)
Stakeholders were not clear about the terms under which data was released,
and asked for data licensing, with more clear terms. (6) Respondents were
concerned about ways that governments might prevent data release to
protect itself, or might treat different data requestors differently. Our
recommendations were shaped in part by the application of these findings.

45. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
46. Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 19, 2015).

1920

B.

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:3

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT II: THE CITY

Having generated some context for our discussion by connecting with
residents and other stakeholders, we turn to a discussion of how the City of
Seattle actually processes and shares data. This section discusses the
findings of interviews with city departments relevant to municipal data
management and release.
1. The City of Seattle as a Case for Study
One underlying premise of this research is the tension or conflict
between the adoption of “smart city” technology and the protection of
privacy and fairness for the individuals and groups who generate the data.
In this respect, recent events have made Seattle an ideal case for study. On
February 3, 2015, the City of Seattle formulated and adopted a set of privacy
principles, which will guide the actions the city takes when collecting and
using personal information. Central to the principles is the following policy
statement: “We work to find a fair balance between gathering information
to provide needed services and protecting the public’s privacy.”47 The six
privacy principles adopted speak to the importance of keeping personal
information private when collecting it, storing and using only what is
needed for city services, and being accountable for “managing your personal
information in a manner that is consistent with our commitments and as
required by law.”48 Where possible, the City also commits to updating
information to be accurate, and notifying citizens on how information is
used.
Many Seattle departments have adopted or contracted for the use of
various smart city technologies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of public services. Smart cities have been defined according to their use of
large-scale sensor networks to improve the provision of city services.49 As
Rob Kitchin explains,
The notion of a ‘smart city’ refers to the increasing extent to which
urban places are composed of ‘everyware’; that is, pervasive and
ubiquitous computing and digitally instrumented devices built
into the very fabric of urban environments (e.g., fixed and wireless
telecom networks, digitally controlled utility services and
transport infrastructure, sensor and camera networks, building
47. CITY OF SEATTLE, PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/
Departments/InformationTechnology/City-of-Seattle-Privacy-Principles-FINAL.pdf.
Disclosure: One of us assisted Seattle in its formulation of privacy principles through his
participation in an advisory board.
48. Id.
49. Kitchin, supra note 8, at 1–2.
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management systems, and so on) that are used to monitor, manage
and regulate city flows and processes, often in real-time, and
mobile computing (e.g., smart phones) used by many urban
citizens to engage with and navigate the city which themselves
produce data about their users (such as location and activity).50

The adoption of these technologies amongst Seattle’s departments, and
the simultaneous adoption and development of citywide privacy principles,
signify the tension that exists between the perceived role of the city as a
custodian, consumer, and distributor of data about residents. Depending on
the perspective one has, or rationale one adopts, the same categories of data
may be considered either to be of value to the public—therefore warranting
public distribution, or of value to the public—meaning it should be kept in
a secure state with strict controls on access.
2. Selected Departments: A Sample Size of Eight
Like virtually all mid- to large-sized municipalities, the City of Seattle
functions more as a federated system of departments than a hierarchy.51 The
open data portal in Seattle is the product of activities conducted by the
Department of Information Technology, which oversees the third-party
contractor who maintains the portal. However, each department in the City
governs the data it generates with considerable autonomy.
With regards to the release of data, departments are also subject to many
different rules and regulations, from both internal and external sources. The
Washington PRA, however, applies to all departments.52 Thus, many of the
City’s units are involved in the release of data.
The City of Seattle contains thirty-six departments and agencies.53
Within this population, we selected eight to research: the Department of
Information Technology; the Department of Planning and Development;
Finance and Administrative Services; Seattle City Light; the Department
of Transportation; the Police Department; Parks and Recreation; and the
Fire Department. A few criteria, generally organized around the principles
of maximizing internal variation and generalizability, guided our selection.
In consultation with City staff, departments were selected to represent the
variety of challenges and approaches cities face as data is pushed, pulled, and
spilled. Most, but not all of the selected departments, are active users of the
50. Id. (internal citations omitted).
51. In comparison to private firms, municipalities appear to be very flat organizations.
This is due in part to the sheer number of roles and responsibilities mandated for and by
local government.
52. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2014).
53. See Departments and Agencies, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/city
-departments/departments-and-agencies (last visited June 23, 2015).
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open data portal. Many, but not all, are undergoing rapid changes in data
management due to the adoption of new information technology. Almost
all govern at least some data that is understood to be either sensitive or
confidential, though the characteristics of the data subjects and the
attributes of those datasets differ considerably. This list includes the
departments that receive the greatest demand for public disclosure requests,
but also some that experience very few. They rely on a wide variety of third
party contractors for information-intensive services.
Importantly, however, departments were selected to represent the
variety of technologies and enriched information flows that are the hallmark
of smart cities. For this purpose, we based selection on a rationale
categorizing sensors and data subjects as “stationary” or “mobile.” Both a
sensor and data subject can be stationary, as is the case with advanced meters
with sensors that automatically record electrical or water use in the home or
office. The sensitivity of this data is generally a function of its granularity
over time. A sensor can be stationary while the subject of the data is mobile.
This is the case in the study and provision of transportation services, which
track the movements of data subjects. Both the sensor and data subject can
be mobile. Video cameras hoisted on police patrol cars or pinned on the
lapels of police officers’ uniforms are examples. This schema is useful for
beginning to think about ways that information technology advances can
result in the production of more sensitive data.
With the eight departments selected, in-person and telephone
interviews were conducted with departmental personnel in various roles
associated with the push, pull, and spill of municipal data.
a) The Department of Information Technology
Shortly after President Obama signed the 2009 Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government,54 the start-up firm Socrata
approached the Department of Information Technology about purchasing
its services to support open data. After about a year of conversation, Seattle
contracted with Socrata and began the process of selecting and examining
datasets for release to an open data portal.55
In considering the publication of data, the Department of Information
Technology uses a classification system with four levels:
Public Information: Public information can be or currently is
released to the public. It does not need protection from
54. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment.
55. Interview, Department of Information Technology personnel, Seattle, Wash.
(Jan. 21, 2015).
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unauthorized disclosure, but does need integrity and availability
protection controls. This would include general public
information, published reference documents (within copyright
restrictions), open source materials, approved promotional
information and press releases.
Sensitive Information: Sensitive information may not be
specifically protected from disclosure by law and is for official use
only. Sensitive information is generally not released to the public
unless specifically requested. Although most all of this
information is subject to disclosure laws because of the City’s
status as a public entity, it still requires careful management and
protection to ensure the integrity and obligations of the City’s
business operations and compliance requirements. It also includes
data associated with internal email systems and City User account
activity information.
Confidential Information: Confidential information is
information that is specifically protected in all or in part from
disclosure under the State of Washington Public Disclosure Laws.
This could include certain personally identifiable information or
vendor trade secrets.
Confidential Information Requiring Special Handling:
Confidential information is specifically protected from disclosure
by law and subject to strict handling requirements dictated by
statutes, regulations, or legal agreements. Serious consequences
could arise from unauthorized disclosure, such as threats to critical
infrastructure, increased systems vulnerability and health and
safety, or legal sanctions. Departments handling this category of
information must demonstrate compliance with applicable
statutes, regulatory requirements and legal agreements.
Information in this category could include patient health records
or student school records.56

Note that the first level pertains to data the City considers applicable for
posting as open data (push). The second pertains to data that is subject to
disclosure by request (pull). The last two levels pertain to confidential data
for which City staff have “a legal reason to refuse public disclosure.”57
On the incentives for releasing data, department personnel suggest that
they try to save costs on public disclosure requests. The message that
pushing data to an online portal may result in more efficient public
56. E-mail Communication, Department of Information Technology Personnel (Jun.
29, 2015).
57. Interview, Department of Information Technology Personnel, Seattle, Wash.
(Jan. 21, 2015).
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disclosure is reinforced by the PRA, which notes, “The internet provides for
instant access to public records at a significantly reduced cost to the agency
and the public. Agencies are encouraged to make commonly requested
records available on agency web sites.”58 Another rationale for municipal
open data is the prospect of promoting economic or business growth in the
city after the Great Recession. Importantly, department personnel also
express hope that public open data has been anonymized properly. As they
say, “how do you make a race car go faster? You give it better brakes.”59
b) The Department of Planning and Development
One of the early and active participants in the open data portal was the
Department of Planning and Development.60 Most city datasets that
concern infrastructure do not pertain to critical infrastructure. Among the
datasets made public by the Department are Geographic Information
System (GIS) files that show plans, land use, zoning, critical areas,
topography, vicinity to park property, landmarks, planning and permits. All
permits for work done on private property are posted to the open data portal.
Department personnel describe the postings as “complete,” and they can
potentially include location, the property owner’s identity, and the work
performed.
The Department of Planning and Development, like all departments
contributing open data, is thought to be the “owner” of the data, and it is
up to their discretion whether to participate. The rationale behind Planning
and Development’s decision to participate is common to many departments
that publicize data. Departments consider “the business case”: is this data
subject to repeated public disclosure requests? Would the preemptive
preparation and release of the data through the open data portal save time
and resources when compared to responding to public disclosure requests?61
c) Finance and Administrative Services
In the first analysis of sensitive data for release to the open data portal,
the Department of Information Technology worked with Finance and
Administrative Services to assess the risk of making business license data
publicly accessible. As explained in their risk analysis:

58. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520, finding 2010 c 69 (2010).
59. Interview, Department of Information Technology Personnel, Seattle, Wash.
(Jan. 21, 2015).
60. Interview, Department of Planning and Development Personnel, Seattle, Wash.
(Jan. 14, 2015).
61. Id.
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The Department of Finance and Administrative Services has
developed a process for evaluating datasets against eight principles
of open data and a risk analysis profile associated with publishing
the data. The risk analysis defines who the final decision maker
should be, and who will decide whether or not to publish the
dataset.62

The principles the Departments referred to are the “8 Principles of
Open Government Data,” formulated during a 2007 meeting convened by
Tim O’Reilly, of O’Reilly Media, and Carl Malamud, of
Public.Resource.Org, with sponsorship from the Sunlight Foundation,
Google, and Yahoo.63 The principles formulated by this group assert that
open government data should be:
1. Complete: All public data is made available. Public data is data
that is not subject to valid privacy, security or privilege limitations.
2. Primary: Data is as collected at the source, with the highest
possible level of granularity, not in aggregate or modified forms.
3. Timely: Data is made available as quickly as necessary to
preserve the value of the data.
4. Accessible: Data is available to the widest range of users for the
widest range of purposes.
5. Machine Processable: Data is reasonably structured to allow
automated processing.
6. Non-discriminatory: Data is available to anyone, with no
requirement of registration.
7. Non-proprietary: Data is available in a format over which no
entity has exclusive control.
8. License-free: Data is not subject to any copyright, patent,
trademark or trade secret regulation. Reasonable privacy, security
and privilege restrictions may be allowed.64

62. City of Seattle Department of Finance and Administrative Services, Open Data
Candidate Requirements and Risk Evaluation—Business License Data 3 (May 6, 2010),
http://dropbox.ashlock.us/opengov/seattle/Open%20Data%20Candidate%20Requiremen
ts%20and%20Risk%20Evaluation%20V1%209.docx [hereinafter City of Seattle, Open
Data Candidate Requirements].
63. Open Government Data Principles, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007),
https://public.resource.org/8_principles.html.
64. Id.
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The Departments also added that customer service personnel
responsible for constituent requests should be notified.65 Seattle’s risk
analysis compared each data type in the business license dataset to each of
these eight principles. Analysis proceeded field by field, noting which were
to be excluded from release because they contained data for internal use
only, of a personal nature, or data generated by the system (i.e., data that is
only of use to those who operate the business registration system). For
example, analysis of the data under the first of the eight principles revealed
several fields that contained sensitive data, which should be excluded from
release.66
The final recommendations focused on the potential legal risk if a data
type were released. The Departments recommended publishing part of the
dataset,67 that is, publishing the dataset without mailing addresses and
[personal] regulatory information. The analysis recommended that a subset
of the data be extracted each month, and prepared for output to the open
data portal.
The decision to publish the data was influenced by the perceived risks
inherent in publication. Low-risk data could be published as is, while highrisk data required “too much data clean up” prior to publication.68 Mediumrisk datasets required exclusion of only certain fields. The business license
dataset risk analysis concluded with the statement: “The risk for this dataset
is rated at Medium, therefore the final approver for publishing this dataset
to data.seattle.gov will be the [Finance and Administrative Services]
director.”69
While this example illustrates the reasoning and approach Seattle has
taken toward releasing datasets on Socrata’s platform, Financial and
Administrative Services Department personnel note that the effort required
to release secure data has escalated significantly.70 The department is
currently working in coordination with several other cities in the Puget
Sound region on an initiative to convert all business and occupation (B&O)
tax data to an online portal for processing payments and providing results
to queries for tax information. While not open data in the same sense as the
data pushed to the Socrata platform, this initiative also proposes to reduce

65. City of Seattle, Open Data Candidate Requirements, supra note 62, at 17.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 19.
68. See, e.g., id. at 9.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Interview, Department of Planning and Development personnel, Seattle, Wash.
(Jan. 14, 2015).
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costs to taxpayers by allowing secure, online payment and retrieval of tax
information.
d) Seattle City Light
Seattle City Light is Seattle’s publically owned electric power utility
company. Currently, most of Seattle’s residences are still outfitted with
mechanical or relatively simple digital meters for reading and recording the
rate of electricity consumption.71 Seattle City Light employees take readings
at the customer’s residence or business location. This method delivers no
more than six points of data per year, in sync with the utility’s bi-monthly
billing cycle.72 However, technology in this sector has advanced rapidly, and
Seattle’s meter system is changing.
Seattle City Light has implemented three programs on a path toward
smart metering. In 2008, the utility tried a pilot program with 457 meters
that relied on cellular technology to provide daily, one-way, communication
(from the customer’s site to the utility).73 Another estimated 6,000 meters,
in places the utility describes as “hard to reach,” are using radio frequency
technology to signal usage to the utility.74 For several years, the utility has
also operated a program for customers who manage mid- to large-sized
properties, providing continuous two-way communication through meters
hooked up to phone lines. Referred to as Seattle Meter Watch, the program
is part of a larger industry-led initiative, known as the Green Button
Initiative. Since 2012, the Green Button initiative has been a White Houseled effort to allow consumers to access detailed data about their electricity
usage, and take advantage of online tools for saving money by managing
their use. Seattle was the first utility in the nation to be certified under this
initiative.75
As part of the utility’s six-year Strategic Plan, Seattle City Light has
begun to scale up the installation of advanced meters. Unlike the city’s
mechanical meters, which are simply read to produce one aggregated
measure of electrical use per household or business address every two
months, the meters available on the market today allow the option of using
sensors to disaggregate overall electricity consumption in order to discern

71. Interview, Seattle City Light Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 29, 2015).
72. Id.
73. Id. The Pilot Project Summary and Conclusions are on file with authors.
74. Id.
75. Seattle City Light First Utility Certified for Green Button Data, SEATTLE.GOV,
http://powerlines.seattle.gov/2014/06/20/seattle-city-light-first-utility-certified-for-green
-button-data.
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the use of identifiable electronic appliances.76 This type of sensor gives users
and utilities the option of viewing the consequences of appliance use in
terms of electrical demand in real-time.
Beyond allowing users to respond to and manage demand, Seattle City
Light personnel also describe the potential benefits of this new technology
in terms of the ability to more precisely discern where electricity is flowing,
to re-route electricity based on this information, to improve the
management of voltage issues and problems in the system, and to ensure a
smooth flow of electricity.77 This will also allow the utility to identify more
precisely where in the system people may be tapping electricity illegally. Of
course, as all of this data becomes more detailed, reporting electrical
consumption over time or by appliance, it carries a greater potential to
compromise the privacy and security of the home and workplace.
e) Department of Transportation
Transportation assets are expensive to build, operate, and maintain, and
until recently, transportation departments have also had to spend inordinate
amounts of money, time, and labor to simply collect data to estimate how
much we use the various components of our transportation networks. The
integration of GPS technology in smart devices on our person or in our cars
has fundamentally transformed this problem for the Department of
Transportation from one of costly and time-consuming data collection, to
one of concern about the privacy implications of collecting and using
personalized data. For example, the City has contracted the services of
Parkeon to operate pay stations that accept credit card payments for
parking,78 and has recently added the services of Pay by Phone, a mobile
payment vendor. In these cases the vendors develop databases that contain
vehicle information and the identities of parking permit purchasers. The
vendor attempts to anonymize the data by removing a subset of fields, and
feeds the resulting dataset back to the department.
In regard to travel behavior, we found two opposing approaches to data
collection underway in the Department. One unit within the Department
contracts with the fitness software company Strava to provide data
describing the movements of individuals who have opted in to the use of
their running and cycling app.79 Another unit in the Department has been
using, through the vendor Acyclica, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi readers installed

76. For an explanation of this process, see UWTV, UW Four Peaks -- Shwetak Patel,
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnzzTFs0O2g.
77. Telephone Interview, Seattle City Light Personnel (Apr. 7, 2015).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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in public places that automatically read and record the Media Access
Control (MAC) addresses of multiple devices—i.e., smartphones, laptops,
and automobile computers—to track the movement of individuals across
the city. A MAC address is a serial number assigned to a computing device,
typically during the manufacturing process, to make that device uniquely
identifiable from all other network devices in the world. When turned on,
personal computing devices constantly send their MAC addresses in signals
that perform an electronic handshake with Bluetooth and Wi-Fi routers. In
this case, Acyclica has been granted permission from the City to install
readers that “sniff” and send the unique MAC identifier of personal devices
to the servers of the firm. The firm, in turn, sends the data it collects on
personal travel behavior to the Department.80 Though people have no
obvious way of knowing that their movements are tracked by Acyclica’s
devices, the firm operates a web-based portal that allows anyone with a
MAC address to retrieve the travel behavior data specific to that device.81
f) Police Department
With respect to open data, the Seattle Police Department is a selfdescribed “manufacturer of data for the public.”82 In terms of the demand
for data, people have always expressed an interest in police activities,
listening to police scanners, and requesting incident reports and data from
911 calls. The Department has adopted multiple technologies with
implications for the generation of big data: they have a cloud-based service
that captures citizens’ online reporting, they deploy smart phones, they have
computers onboard vehicles, they generate in-car video and body camera
video, and are proposing to develop a data analytics platform with multiple
applications. The Police Department typically receives three times more
public record disclosure requests than any other department in the city.83 In
the first quarter of 2015, the number of requests rose by 400%, to an
estimated 2,500.84
Personnel in the Seattle Police Department note that the rising increase
in demand for public disclosure has coincided with the digitization of files
and the advent of video recording devices mounted on the dashboards of
80. Interview, Seattle Department of Transportation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar.
10, 2015).
81. See Analyzer User Guide, ACYCLICA, https://acyclica.com/support/documentation
(last visited March 12, 2015). The web portal is available at https://acyclica.com/products/
acyclica-analyzer.
82. Interview, Seattle Police Department Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 14, 2015).
83. Interview, Seattle Police Department Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015).
84. Id.
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patrol cars and worn on the bodies of officers.85 Gradual shifts over time
have allowed public disclosure requests to become anonymous and free of
charge. Individuals in the department explained that people making public
disclosure requests used to have to provide a phone number to call, so that
people would be notified when the documents were ready, or could be called
to clarify the request. As one interviewee explained:
[T]he department has moved from paper to electronic, so the
people think it should be accessible data, they think that a report
should be available right away, even though there are protocols.
The types of records [now include] body cams, in-car video, 911
calls, audio statements in the field, photos, officers receive video,
text messaging, emails, web browsing. People expect to be able to
access this information as much as they want in real time.86

Departmental personnel explained how demands rise “on the back end”
with the number of public disclosure requests.87 The department receives
about 125 requests per week. The department employs seven people fulltime to respond to public disclosure requests, plus additional attorneys,
paralegals, and people dedicated to 911 and video requests.88 Each request
to the department generates a series of actions and corresponding logs.
Detectives assigned to the relevant case participate in the process, helping
review requested information for civilian safety, privacy, officer safety and
for compliance with numerous other policies and regulations that pertain to
police records. The personnel involved are “very careful and conscious of the
fact that we are dealing with victims and the most vulnerable and not on
their best day.” As they explain, “we want victims to continue to cooperate
with the department, all weighting this with trying to be as open as we can.”
People are given the data they have the authority to receive (e.g., victims
receive different data than the media). When data is not released, officers
are required to explain the reasons in an exemption log.
The Police Department is struggling with the demands created by the
sheer volume of both footage and requests. Specifically, the Department
must wrestle with privacy concerns stemming from the fact that body
camera video contains recordings of persons other than the police officer.
In its most recent move, as part of the recently initiated program using body
worn video cameras, the department has launched its own YouTube
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Work “on the back end” consists of the tasks that Department personnel must
carry out in order to satisfy a public records request.
88. Id.
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channel.89 Besides posting raw video clips that have been processed for
public disclosure, the department is blurring video content and deleting
audio (to “redact” the identity of persons in the video) that has not been
through the process, and posting these feeds to YouTube to facilitate public
disclosure, with dates, times and incident numbers so that interested parties
can see what is available and make more specific requests.
g) Parks and Recreation
Seattle Parks and Recreation maintains twenty-six community centers
and organizes hundreds of volunteers to provide community services and
events. Those events are attended by thousands of children and adults
registered in their databases each year.90 The Department takes a
conservative approach to public disclosure requests. Personnel have been
successful in redacting the information describing the people who volunteer
to run and attend their programs and, under the law, the City has the
discretion to redact considerable amounts of information pertaining to
juveniles.
Perhaps as a result of working predominantly with youth and at-risk
populations, such as special needs children, Department personnel
expressed the need to be careful when releasing information for public
consumption.91 The Department has sensitive information about
employees, volunteers, and adults and youth registered for programs. They
are aware that the use of personal information, when distributed through
either open data portals or in response to public disclosure requests, can give
people the information they would need to be able to harass someone, stalk
someone, seek revenge, and commit various crimes. Personnel described
fights between individuals, a person stalking a volunteer, and community
groups pitted against one another over a controversial park project, as
examples of circumstances that have precipitated public disclosure requests
for personal information. Personnel described their success disclosing
incident reports to requestors, while redacting the information that could
be used to contact the other party.
h) Fire Department
The Seattle Fire Department manages large amounts of data, but has
not yet gravitated to new information technologies to the degree that Seattle
City Light, the Department of Transportation, and the Police Department

89. SPD BodyWornVideo, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcdSPR
Nt1HmzkTL9aSDfKuA (last visited July 22, 2015).
90. Interview, Seattle Parks and Recreation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015).
91. Id.
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have. Unlike other departments, the Fire Department provides emergency
medical services, and controls the release of medical data in accordance with
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
and related rules and regulations governing personal health information.
Approximately 80–90% of Fire Department responses to calls are
medically related.92 In these situations Fire Department personnel produce
paper and carbon copy medical reports that they input into special HIPAAcompliant scanning devices. About 200 two-page medical reports have to
be entered each day.93 Before it is stored in Department databases, data is
shared and reviewed by the Department, the station that responded to the
call, and with University of Washington doctors working with the Fire
Department. It reportedly takes about ninety days before these records enter
the Department databases. Department personnel suspect that the
movement to digitize this process is not likely to change the demand for
public disclosure of these records because requestors have to provide proof
of identification, such as a scanned copy of a driver’s license, to receive a
copy of a report.
The Fire Department also stores sensitive data that does not pertain to
HIPAA. And, like other departments, it receives requests that appear
“frivolous.”94 Interviewees explained that a person could make a targeted use
of the law to inundate the Department with requests. Even though a request
appears frivolous, “you are legally required to respond . . . but we can’t
possibly respond.” The PRA requires a response within five days of every
request. The fine for missing this window, can reach as much $100 per page,
per day. “It’s the only hard deadline and [someone] could try to get you to
trip up and you have to hit respond to those. Some of them could be months’
worth of work. [Someone could] then send a message to the council
threatening to sue and say you are not in compliance with the PRA.”95
The Fire Department, like other departments, is experiencing pressure
to release data in the form of public disclosure requests. However,
accustomed to maintaining medical and other sensitive data on paper and
specialized electronic systems, this department realizes many such requests
may not be justifiable.
3. Analysis
The one common approach departments have in regards to open data is
the desire to reduce the financial cost of public disclosure. If pushing data
92.
93.
94.
95.

Telephone Interview, Seattle Fire Department Personnel (Mar. 19, 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to the open data portal, a YouTube channel, or a more sophisticated portal
such as the Green Button initiative, promises to reduce the cost of
responding to public disclosure requests, then departments generally aim to
do so.
Departments differ widely, however, in their pace and degree of
adoption of smart technologies, and thus they differ in terms of the
challenges they face in preserving privacy and social justice when data is
pulled for public disclosure from city files. Departmental personnel
appeared interested in serving the public interest and fostering transparency.
Many also share concerns that the PRA can be, or perhaps already is being
used for, self-interested, wasteful, or harmful purposes. The timing of the
growth of such requests coincides with the transition from paper to digital
records, from charging a nominal fee to copy records to providing them at
no charge, and from named to anonymous requests. The piecemeal
exemptions to public disclosure that have accrued in the PRA show that
some departments have tried to solve the problem through the State
Legislature. The PRA includes a lengthy list of data exempt from release,
categorizing exemptions based on specifically named attributes (e.g., name,
address, telephone number) in the data, subjects represented by the data,
and public programs or other contexts that motivated the public collection
and disclosure of the data.96 Other departments have taken a slower

96. The Public Records Act lists types of data exempt from public disclosure and, in
doing so, either names specific attributes or uses the broader term “personally identifying
information” to specify the data that are to be exempt. For example, in a section pertaining
to public utilities and transportation information, exemptions include:
addresses, telephone numbers, electronic contact information, and
customer-specific utility usage and billing information in increments less
than a billing cycle of the customers of a public utility contained in the
records or lists held by the public utility of which they are customers,
except that this information may be released to the division of child
support or the agency or firm providing child support enforcement for
another state under Title IV-D of the federal social security act, for the
establishment, enforcement, or modification of a support order.
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.330(2) (2014). Further on, in the same section, exemptions
include:
The personally identifying information of persons who acquire and use
transponders or other technology to facilitate payment of tolls. This
information may be disclosed in aggregate form as long as the data does
not contain any personally identifying information. For these purposes
aggregate data may include the census tract of the account holder as long
as any individual personally identifying information is not released.
Personally identifying information may be released to law enforcement
agencies only for toll enforcement purposes. Personally identifying
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approach to adopting technology, concerned about the very same
implications. A few have been more deliberative in their service of public
disclosure requests, taking a more proactive stance of exempting personal
information from public disclosure requests.
Interviewees’ conceptions of the market for municipal data varied.
When favoring the commercial application of open data, interviewees’
conceptions of the firm appeared to be aligned with small startups and newly
created firms. The idea of pushing data to an open platform for commercial
use is not universally embraced, however. Many interviewees questioned the
idea that it is possible to favor the interests of some firms, such as small
startups, over others, when data made open is open to all. Those concerned
with the differential treatment of firms seemed to have a broader view of
the market for municipal data, including large, well-apportioned
organizations. Only the Police Department expressed awareness of the way
data brokers use publicly disclosed data—an issue raised because of the uses
of profiles in criminal investigations. Contractual relationships between the
city and firms cloud these issues. Finance and Administrative Services, for
example, raised the issue of the unintended spilling of data by the vendors
under contract to the city to create online data portals. Seattle City Light
will face the same issues in designing portals for advanced metering data.
C.

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT: OPEN DATA ANALYSIS

This section explains the technical analyses we conducted on the City
of Seattle’s current municipal open data. At issue is the question of how the
city may evaluate, prior to release, the potential for a dataset to compromise
privacy.
1. The Problem of Cumulative Risk of Re-Identification
From our initial interviews we learned that most datasets released by the
City of Seattle on the open data portal had received some scrutiny with
regard to potential privacy harms. However, the practices in place only
modeled the risk of data releases for each dataset in isolation.
As various scholars have found, otherwise innocuous datasets can be
joined together in ways that result in re-identification and breaches of
privacy. This simple fact, evidenced by the accomplishments and practices
of firms that have amassed detailed dossiers on millions of people, is reason

information may be released to law enforcement agencies for other
purposes only if the request is accompanied by a court order.
§ 42.56.330(7).
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to question the ability of a municipality to release any one dataset about
persons while preserving the anonymity of those persons.97
Public policy reflects the idea that the potential harm caused by releases
of personal information is a function of what the combination of two or
more pieces of information may reveal about an individual. This is expressed
in various state laws by the way in which they approach Personally
Identifiable Information (PII),98 typically defined as the combination of two
or more attributes for the purpose of protecting individuals’ privacy, identity
and personal safety.99 The City’s policies and regulatory framework for
governing the release of data generally follow this line of reasoning. As
illustrated by its release of business license data, the City of Seattle correctly
and appropriately uses this criterion to manage the issue of potential privacy
harm in their analysis of each dataset prior to publication. However, this is
an analysis of a dataset in isolation.
The fact that multiple datasets can potentially be joined together using
matching information in common fields threatens the validity of any risk
assessment that has been limited to a single set of data. All that an actor
would have to do to invalidate the claim that the release of any one dataset
is risk-free is to join it across common fields with identical or similar data.
97. See Ohm, supra note 11; Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 11, at 24–26; Solon
Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent, in
PRIVACY BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, 44–75 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
98. Security Breach Notification Chart, PERKINS COIE, https://www.perkinscoie.com/
en/news-insights/security-breach-notification-chart.html (last visited July 21, 2015)
(providing a full list of state definitions of PII, current as of June 2015).
99. See NIST, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/
sp800-122.pdf. The NIST Guide defines PII to include:
[A]ny information about an individual maintained by an agency,
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place
of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other
information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical,
educational, financial, and employment information.
Id. See also Narayanan & Schmatikov, supra note 11, at 24. Narayanan and
Schmatikov note:
PII is surprisingly difficult to define. One legal context is provided by
breach-notification laws. California Senate Bill 1386 is a representative
example: its definition of personal information includes Social Security
numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial accounts, but not, for
example, email addresses or telephone numbers. These laws were enacted
in response to security breaches involving customer data that could
enable identity theft.
Id.
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The resulting merged dataset would not have to be a successful join of every
record in order to be used to re-identify individuals, or to associate persons
with attributes that threaten to compromise privacy or safety. In other
words, cities looking to release public data responsibly face the need to
develop their capacity to assess the privacy posture of collections of datasets
more globally, encompassing the impact that additional releases may have
in combination with existing corpuses of publicly, and perhaps privately
available data.
2. A Proposed Method of Ex Ante Evaluation
Our research includes an analysis of the tabular data already released and
publicly available at Seattle.gov. The research design presented here models
the methods that could be used to assess the privacy of collections of datasets
before they are released from municipalities.100
Someone wishing to identify potential privacy-violating joins must first
take the step of identifying what joins are possible. Traditional database
joins involve simply combining records from one table with another based
on a known shared field. Our aim, however, is to discern the maximum
possible extent of joins. So, in contrast to traditional approaches, the joins
we are contemplating combine information, which may not be perfectly
matched, or may be nominally classified as different. The purpose is to
produce the greatest possible degree of connections across datasets that have
been published separately. For example, fields with differing data types, or
combinations of fields such as latitude and longitude can be joined across
datasets with a field called “address” if sufficiently overlapping information
is compared.
A second step is to then assess identified joins for their potential harms
to privacy. To accomplish this, some care must be taken to correctly
categorize and classify the types of information in the datasets. The analysis
depends on an understanding of the harms made possible through the
association of different attributes, as they are found in the published datasets
and joined using the methods described above. Rules and regulations
governing personally identifiable information offer limited guidance;101

100. Anyone in the City interested in evaluating an additional dataset prior to release
would add that dataset to the corpus of existing public data and repeat the analysis. It is
important to note, however, that our analysis was limited in time and resources. It
represents a starting point for further research.
101. See Narayanan & Schmatikov, supra note 11, at 25 (“What is ‘reasonable’? This is
left open to interpretation by case law. We are not aware of any court decisions that define
identifiability in the context of HIPAA.”).
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empirical cases of re-identification are more likely to inform this part of the
exercise.
These two steps are encapsulated in Rob Kitchin’s definitions of
indexical and attribute data. Indexical data is important because it enables
attributes to be linked, and often is the data that can be used to identify the
subject of the attribute.102 Unique identifiers such as passport numbers,
account numbers, MAC addresses, order and shipping numbers, and
manufacturing serial numbers are examples of indexical data, as well as
names, addresses, and zip codes. What people and firms are joining together
with the use of indexical data are attributes that describe the subjects of the
data. As Kitchin notes, “Attribute data are data that represent aspects of a
phenomenon, but are not indexical in nature. For example, with respect to
a person the indexical data might be a fingerprint or DNA sequence, with
associated attribute data being age, sex, height, weight, eye colour, blood
group, and so on.”103 The vast bulk of data in storage are attribute data, and
because the attributes that may be sensitive in terms of privacy or social
justice are associated with various indexical fields, this association places
sensitive data at risk.
The expansion of indexical fields gives rise to new and more expansive
datasets, along with rising hazards to privacy and social justice. In addition
to these factors, the adoption of advanced technologies further thickens the
flow of information, with more opportunity to join or enrich existing
datasets with potentially compromising information. Kitchin mentions how
the ingenuity and economic drive of people and firms to find more and more
ways to join data has resulted in the expansion of fields considered useful
for indexing.104 Thus the threat of re-identification with the release of data
is a moving target. As more variables become useful for indexing, more
publicly available datasets may be used to join datasets in previously
unimagined ways.
One way to operationalize the first step—determining which joins are
possible—is to turn collections of tabular datasets into network graphs that
illustrate a variety of strategies for identifying potential joins between
multiple datasets. This approach casts individual tables (i.e., each a dataset)
as nodes in a network, connected by lines as identified by a specific join
identification strategy (e.g., joining tables on the basis of specific indexical
fields, such as location in space, as identified through latitude and
longitude). If each separate table were joined on one indexical variable,
102. See ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 8 (2014).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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showing tables as nodes and indexical field data on the lines connecting
nodes to one another, one could see within the scope of a single diagram
the possibility for joining multiple datasets. With a diagram showing the
potential to join multiple datasets along one or more indexical fields,
determining the possibility of connecting an attribute in one table to an
attribute in another table could then become a network pathfinding
operation. The network of datasets resulting from this approach would be
amenable to the full-range of network analytical methods.105 New datasets
under consideration for release could be added to the network, and the
changes in network topology studied with precision.
The second step—the assessment of the potential for harm from any
one specific join—is likely to remain somewhat of a human intelligence task.
This approach segments individual attributes into a continuum of privacy
and social justice risk. Combining this continuum with a network dataset
could allow the programmatic identification of instances where connections
between low-risk attributes (e.g., describing the built environment) and
high-risk attributes (e.g., describing persons in the built environment) result
in potential information leaks.
3. Potential Join Strategies
We have envisaged several join identification strategies, all of which
have different characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages with respect to
quality of results, false positive or negative rates, processing time, and
computing resources.
Some of these strategies work at the schema level (i.e., across field names
or column headings, in the case of tabular data), and compare the names of
individual fields (e.g., latitude, longitude, address). These strategies may be
especially useful for inferring links between datasets that are held by a city
and datasets that may not be wholly obtainable by a city (i.e., held by a third
party). For example, one could infer a potential join where two tables share
an “address” column. Other strategies extend the schema comparison
approach by using natural language processing to identify conceptually
related terms, inferring matches between fields such as “location” and
“postal address.”
Other strategies that are more exhaustive operate at the level of the data
itself. These include the attempt to join, through exact matching, all fields
in all datasets. This is computationally expensive, but answers concretely the
question of where deterministic joins are possible. Other variants of this
105. An example of an analytical method that could be applied is Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm. See E. W. Dijkstra, A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs, 1
NUMERISCHE MATHEMATIK 269 (1959).
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strategy include spatial joins, for example, that make geometric comparisons
of the spatial attributes within tables.
Many more join identification strategies are likely to be employed by
data brokers, or other would-be users of these datasets. Future work might
identify additional strategies or integrate ensembles of strategies for
identifying potential joins, such as using natural language processing
techniques to perform meaning-based comparisons of all fields in all
databases.
4. Analysis and Results
We implemented several join identification strategies, and used them to
perform an initial analysis of the datasets that were publicly available from
the City of Seattle’s open data portal, as of April 1, 2015. At that time, there
were 235 datasets on the Socrata open data portal from the City of Seattle.
The strategies we employed include:
 Exact match of field name
 Tokenized match of field name components106
 Levenshtein distance match of field name107
 Natural language processing match of field name (i.e.,
Wordnet)108
 Exhaustive exact match of column contents

106. Technopedia offers the following definition of “Tokenization”:
Tokenization is the act of breaking up a sequence of strings into pieces
such as words, keywords, phrases, symbols and other elements called
tokens. Tokens can be individual words, phrases or even whole
sentences. In the process of tokenization, some characters like
punctuation marks are discarded. The tokens become the input for
another process like parsing and text mining.
Tokenization, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/13698/tokenization
(last visited July 23, 2015).
107. The Levenshtein Distance can be defined as “[t]he smallest number of insertions,
deletions, and substitutions required to change one string or tree into another.” Levenshtein
Distance, NIST, https://xlinux.nist.gov/dads/HTML/Levenshtein.html (last updated June
22, 2015); see also Levenshtein, PHP MANUAL, http://php.net/manual/en/function
.levenshtein.php (last visited July 23, 2015) (“The Levenshtein distance is defined as the
minimal number of characters you have to replace, insert or delete to transform str1 into
str2.”).
108. The Stanford Wordnet Project, http://ai.stanford.edu/~rion/swn/ (last accessed July
23, 2015) (“By applying a learning algorithm to parsed text, we have developed methods
that can automatically identify the concepts in the text and the relations between them.”);
see also Snow et al., Learning Syntactic Patterns for Automatic Hypernym Discovery (2004
Conference on Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems), http://ai.stanford
.edu/~rion/papers/hypernym_nips05.pdf.
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Partial latitude and longitude geometric match of
geospatial column contents
Relatedly, we have partial results of an ordering of the individual fields
found within Seattle’s open datasets. The number of datasets with tabular
data that could be analyzed (i.e., contained field names and field contents)
was 204. The City offices contributing to the corpus of open data included:
City Budget Office; Department of Human Services; Department of
Neighborhoods; Department of Planning and Development; Seattle Fire
Department; Office of the City Clerk; Seattle Police Department; Office of
the Mayor; Seattle City Attorney’s Office; Department of Information
Technology; Department of Transportation; Finance and Administrative
Services; Seattle Public Utilities; and the Seattle City Council.
The datasets contained a wide variety of information, such as building
permits, electrical permits, land use permits, code violations, surveys of
residents’ use of information technology, traffic counts, announcements of
learning programs and events, commute trip reduction surveys, police
department incident reports, active business licenses, 911 call logs, housing
emergency responses, logs of police in-car video, grants and funding,
adopted budgets, and neighborhood matching grant reports. Many were
inventories of infrastructure assets, such as assets listed for auction, cultural
spaces, road weather information systems, trails, street parking signs, and
neighborhood maps. Of note are several datasets on the Socrata portal that
are produced as part of a performance dashboard for municipal services.109
Performance dashboard datasets include, for example, pothole complaints
and repairs, streetlights data, conservation data, planted trees, first arriving
engines in emergency response, police reported collisions, bus ridership, city
building energy use data, pea-patch garden registrants, residential
burglaries, motor vehicle theft, and civil rights performance data.
a) Joins Using Exact and Flexible Matching Strategies
As one would expect, exact matching strategies (i.e., exact matches of
field names, or column headings) for these datasets appear to result in many
false-negatives, whereas more flexible matching strategies appear to result
in many more false-positives. For the purpose of demonstrating potential
flaws in vetting datasets for publication, flexible strategies are important to
use so as to not overlook valid matches; eliminating false positives manually
was the price for complete coverage.
Results from our schema-based join identification strategies suggest a
great deal of connectivity between datasets on Seattle’s open data portal.
109. To explore these datasets, and others, see Performance Seattle, SEATTLE.GOV,
https://performance.seattle.gov.
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The total number of field names in the corpus of 204 datasets was 3,859,
and the number of unique field names (a product of exact match of field
name) was 1,981. Tokenized, the field names in the corpus of datasets
produced 6,061 parsed names. Among these were many duplicates.
Eliminating duplicates left 1,828 parsed field names. The Wordnet
comparison of parsed field names returned thirty-one pairs with 100%
match, and another 230 pairs with a 50% match.110 For example, forty-six
fields are named “address.” Given the ubiquity of certain terms such as
address, as well as other common fields, the number of connectable tables
results in a network graph that expresses the possibility of joining nearly all
tables in the set—forming one comprehensive table out of 204. This
validates the premise that it is possible to recombine data in ways that violate
the current model for vetting publication of datasets (i.e., assessing datasets
in isolation).
Results from our content-based join identification strategies were also
promising. We performed a many-to-many comparison (i.e., an exhaustive
comparison of data entries in all cells), using exact matches only, across all
fields of all datasets. This resulted in a large number of irrelevant matches
for common objects (e.g., numbers, “true/false,” “yes/no”), and very few
exact matches for data in cells. This result was expected, since the published
datasets do not constrain or normalize data in fields. For example, reliance
on exact matches produces results that suggest “302 N Baker Street” is not
an exact match to “302 N Baker St.” This supports the notion that using
broader, more flexible strategies for finding matches and weeding out false
positives is a useful approach.
After the exhaustive join on exact matches of field contents, the next
likely research step was to either use more flexible joining strategies with
the entire corpus of data, or more targeted joins on the basis of potential
privacy harm. We opted to implement the latter, through one smaller but
significant strategy for joins, with the purpose of illustrating some of the
unusual qualities of local government data.
b) The Special Relationship Between Municipalities and Spatial
Data
The more we studied the open datasets, the more it appeared to us that
spatial data is highly represented among Seattle’s municipal open datasets.
We mentioned the commonality of “address” but it is worth noting that
nearly all of the datasets included spatial data of one kind or another (i.e.,
110. Results show how closely Wordnet’s system believes they are related to one
another. The parsed field names included in this analysis were all nouns. All other parts of
speech were excluded.
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latitude, longitude, block, location, mailing, shape, zip code, acres, area, and
shape files).
There is a logical rationale for this observation. If, as employees of
departments had suggested in interviews, efforts to de-identify datasets
prior to publication primarily involved the removal of names, telephone
numbers, and email addresses, while retaining street address (sometimes
aggregated to the nearest 100 block), zip code, or another similar spatial
identifier, then spatial data would be more likely to be retained in the
datasets made public. Also, considering that cities are primarily interested
in data regarding activities within the spatial boundaries of their
jurisdiction, and meaningful determinations of demand, supply, and quality
of services often pertain to the delivery of services across the spatial extent
of the jurisdiction, spatial data is likely to be a key variable in municipal
data.
However, spatial data can also be the means to identify individual home
and business owners and occupants. Residents are readily identified when
their name is associated in any publicly available dataset with these
properties. For example, the City of Seattle includes the names of persons
on building permit applications in open datasets, and King County (which
includes the spatial extent of Seattle) maintains a publicly available dataset
that includes the names of the owners, addresses, and assessed value of the
properties.
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Figure 1: Results of 5-Meter Spatial Join of Latitude and Longitude Column Contents.111

On this basis, we conducted a simple spatial join of datasets sharing the
field names of latitude and longitude. For this procedure, we drew a circle,
5 meters in diameter around each point in space identified in columns with
the heading latitude and longitude (both of which were present in 34 of the
204 tabular datasets available). If the point from one dataset was found
within the circle of a point from another dataset, this constituted a join
between the two datasets.112 Joins between two datasets, measured in this
111. Datasets in Figure 1 are represented by circles with alphanumeric identifiers.
Datasets are linked to one another in the network graph when six or more location matches,
in a 5-meter radius of one another, occur between the datasets. Data collected from all
Tabular datasets on the City of Seattle’s Open Data Portal, as of April 1, 2015.
112. Analysis was carried out using PostGIS, with an overall program logic
instrumented in a combo of Python and Bash. Overview of steps in the analysis:
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way, are highly likely to be referring to the same parcel or piece of property.
The results are shown in Figure 1.
In the figure, nodes correspond to datasets, and are labeled with the
alphanumeric identifiers of datasets used on the Socrata platform. The lines
connecting the nodes indicate matches between datasets. Links were
removed when the number of matches was less than six, thus all lines
indicate more than six matches between datasets. From this visualization
one can assume that nearly all tables in this sample of tables (n = 33) will
have spatial matches.
The meaningfulness of the match depends on the context of the
locations matched. Manual inspection of field names and titles of the
sample datasets suggests that the spatial locations matched are perhaps
public facilities (e.g., community centers hosting multiple types of events,
locations of sensors for data collection such as bicycle and other traffic
counts) but also private facilities (e.g., locations undergoing repeated
building inspections and permitting procedures, locations identified in
multiple events such as 911 calls for police and fire). In this research agenda,
the next step would be to conduct more flexible comparisons where, for
example, latitude and longitude are geocoded and compared to street
addresses or other forms of location information.
c) Attributes on a Continuum of Personalization
In terms of the potential for privacy harm, a very limited scan of
attributes amongst datasets, both within and outside municipal open data
for Seattle, produced a rather rich set of information for the purpose of
profiling individuals. Limited only to three datasets in Seattle and a fourth
in King County, these attributes suggest how weaknesses in the ability to

1. Convert lat/lon text strings into WGS84 Geometries (a reference
datum used by Socrata).
2. Create new empty geometry field.
3. Translate points into NAD83(HARN) Washington State Plane N
format, meter units.
4. Create 5 meter buffer around points. This value was chosen somewhat
arbitrarily to allow matches of points that differ only by the floating point
precision of the lat/lon. This distance was generous enough to smooth
over any minor discrepancies in parcel size, but conservative enough that
any identified matches would pretty much be a stones throw from each
other.
5. Construct spatial indexes using GiST strategy.
6. Identify matches based on the condition of intersection between any
two circular buffers (ST_Intersects function).
7. Return count of matches.
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effectively de-identify individuals through the elimination of indexical fields
and the aggregation of data across space could result in serious consequences
in terms of privacy and social equity.
Table 1: Attributes from Four Open Data Sets on a Continuum of Personalization.113

Fields
Name
Address/Location
Phone Number
Age
Gender
Income
Home Value
Zip Code
Sexual Orientation
Race
Level of Education
Language
Number in Household
Employment
Unpermitted Activity
Internet Use
Uses of Cable
Incident Type/Descrip.
Permitted Activity
Value of Alteration
Permit Type

Property
Value

Datasets
Tech.
Business
User
License
Survey

●
●

●

●
●
●
●

●

Potential
Privacy
Concern

●
●

Persons

●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Building
Permits

Groups

●
●

●
●
●

Unknown

The City of Seattle datasets represented in Table 1 include permitting
data from the Department of Planning and Development, Business License
Data from Financial and Administrative Services, and the Department of
Information Technology’s survey of resident uses of information technology
(n = 2900 residents surveyed). King County’s public dataset showing
property ownership and tax assessment is also included. Note the ability to
113. Some fields of Table 1 contain data that may be used to identify persons or infer
the identity of persons. Some fields contain data that may be used to categorize persons
into racial, social, or economic groups. Government data contains many additional fields
of data with as yet unknown implications for privacy. Fields that may be used to identify
(e.g., name, address) or infer the identity of persons (e.g., age, gender, zip code) are
indexical, and can be used to join these data into one universal set to form dossiers on
individuals, groups of individuals, households, and neighborhoods.
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join the property value, business license, and permitting databases using the
names of the property and business owners. This one act brings together
name and contact information, such as address and phone number.114 While
there is no obvious overlap of fields between the technology user survey, and
other datasets, it is worth noting that one of the more popular and widely
used indexical fields for re-identification is zip code. With the plethora of
demographic fields provided in the survey dataset, it is not difficult to
imagine a data broker or similar type of firm using zip code to join and reidentify survey respondents. At the very least, the privacy implicating and
highly differentiated fields in the survey could make this dataset a desirable
target for commercial interests seeking to re-identify subjects and enrich
their existing dossiers on city residents.
d) One Simple Example of a Profile
Finally, to demonstrate the kind of personal profile which can be
gathered today from open data published by the City of Seattle, we chose a
single location and produced joins from eight Seattle open datasets. The
information gathered from these datasets revealed:
1. Property owner’s full name (multiple spellings)
2. Multiple major building projects, most with associated
code violations related to follow-up and/or inspections
3. Junk storage violations
4. Vacant building-related issues
5. A fire in the main structure
There is enough information in any one of these datasets to join this
profile with the King County dataset that shows the assessed value of
property, which may be used as a proxy for wealth or income. The property
is among those in the city that have received the lowest possible valuation.
There is distress involved in some of the revealed incidents as well as
loss of personal property and net worth, all tied to dates, times and a specific
person’s name. The level of information revealed from the combination of
these eight open data sets—all indexed using spatial location—is more than
most individuals would be comfortable with.
5. Open Data Assessment in Sum
These technical assessments suggest the extent to which the release of
multiple, seemingly benign municipal open datasets holds the potential to
compromise privacy, or pose threats to social justice. The City of Seattle,
114. This emphasizes the importance of excluding licenses for businesses located in
residences from open data.
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however, like many cities in the U.S., governs many more datasets than
those currently available as open data. Many of those datasets are produced,
processed, copied, and stored in the information systems of firms under
contract with the City.
D.

LEGAL ASSESSMENT: VENDOR CONTRACTS

The preceding section describes risk as a function of technical processes,
demonstrating how data that is “safe” in isolation may yield more private
details than anticipated when combined or correlated. In this section, we
describe risk of another sort: the risk associated with turning over the
processing and storage of resident data to third party vendors. Cities use
vendors extensively. And vendors have different capabilities and incentives
than a municipal government; they may be more or less capable of keeping
data secure, and are not likely to be as responsive to residents as their city
government. As our qualitative analysis makes clear, stakeholders will
ultimately hold cities responsible as custodians and expect them to uphold
constituent values.
The relationship between the City of Seattle and its vendors is described
in its contracts. We therefore undertook an analysis of a carefully selected
sampling of contracts between the City and its vendors. The goal of this
research was to determine whether vendors with access to City data—
including data about employees and citizens—were contractually obligated
to engage in best practices around privacy and security, thus preventing the
unintended spilling of data. We found that some were, and others were not.
This does not necessarily mean that any vendor engages in bad behavior,
only that they do not make commitments that help foreclose the possibility.
On the basis of this work, we later recommend that the City generate a
standard contract including privacy and security language to use as a starting
point for any future outsourcing of data processing, gathering, or storage.
Among the insights we gleaned from our focus group sessions were that
residents did not tend to differentiate between the specific constructs of
open government or public records requests and the city’s role in general as
a custodian of resident data. The city collects, stores, processes, and in some
instances shares information. Although we have developed a taxonomy of
push, pull, and spill in this paper, the picture for residents seems rather less
differentiated.
In general, we found that relatively few vendor contracts made
guarantees around the privacy or security of resident or employee data, and
that the contracts that did make such guarantees did not use anything like
the same language. There was no “smoking gun,” in the form of a highly
irresponsible provision, but there were places where due diligence might
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have recommended changes to allay stakeholder fears and concerns. The
findings that follow form the basis of our recommendation, infra Section
IV.G, that the City develop a standard vendor agreement that incorporates
baseline or default provisions regarding how information is accessed, shared,
and secured.
Residents want to feel as though cities are using information wisely to
their benefit across the board. Cities do not collect, process, or store
information on their own. Like all major enterprises, they work with
partners. Accordingly, the circle of trust regarding municipal data is wider
than just a city itself—it includes their providers. Cities entrust resident data
to providers for a variety of purposes, including storage, analysis, and
connectivity. For example, the City of Seattle Police Department works
with Evidence.com—a subsidiary of Taser—to store video from police lapel
cameras. Seattle employees work with Verizon and Motorola to
communicate. As noted previously, the City’s existing open data portal is
managed by Socrata.
The primary means by which cities can maintain its trust with residents
in light of these partnerships is by getting these providers to agree to a
comparable level of responsibility and data hygiene. Indeed, the city’s
relationships with vendors are governed by terms of service, privacy policies,
and other service agreements.
We undertook to examine these documents in an effort to assess
whether they respect privacy and security by their terms. Our method
involved selecting eighteen particularly important master agreements (plus
sub-documentation) from five departments. We based this selection on the
in-depth interviews we conducted with employees across the City. An
attorney in private practice analyzed the documents according to parameters
set by a member of our team with deep experience in privacy law, specifically
including privacy policies and terms of service. That team member then
reviewed and synthesized the findings for presentation here.
1. Privacy
We first looked for language addressing what if any rights the subjects
of data being processed by the City’s partners may have. In the consumer
privacy context, such rights generally include understanding what
information has been collected and why, how it is secured, with whom it is
shared, and so on. A good benchmark is the set of obligations imposed on
websites under California’s privacy notice law.115
115. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014). See also CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC:
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The picture on privacy was mixed. Whereas some providers specifically
reference the ability of data subjects to access their data (e.g., Paybyphone,
Volgistics, and Microsoft), many others made no reference to privacy or
data subjects at all (e.g., Kubra, FileLocal, and MacroCCS).116 Some
agreements assumed a relationship with the data subject: PayByPhone
agreed to “provide an easy to use customer account management website.”117
Other agreements seemed to assume that the City would remain the point
of contact for data subjects: Microsoft, which hosts and processes a variety
of City data, committed not to respond to data subject requests absent the
City’s prior written consent or a legal obligation.118 There was next to no
language obligating vendors to notify data subjects of anything, except in
the case of a data breach as discussed in the next section. And long-term
retention was, if mentioned, framed as a benefit.
A variety of contracts (e.g., those with CopLogic, Hewitt, and Affirma)
addressed the privacy-related concept of “confidential information.”
Confidential information does not always intersect with the sensitive
information of data subjects.119 For example, the Motorola agreement
defines it as “any information that is . . . marked, designated, or identified
at the time of disclosure to [sic] as being confidential.”120 However,
confidential information can so intersect. CopLogic, a software IT company
that services the City’s online police reporting system, defines confidential
information to include certain “City employee information” such as Social
Security numbers or email addresses.121 Confidential information can also
include the vendor’s own “ideas, concepts, know-how or techniques,” i.e.,

RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY (May 2014),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices
_public.pdf.
116. Kubra, FileLocal, and MacroCCS jointly service the Washington State Business
License and Tax Portal Agency, an online portal to pay for business licenses and taxes for
several Washington cities including Seattle.
117. PayByPhone Technologies, Inc. Vendor Contract #2992, § 10 “Ownership and
Privacy of End User Information,” at 4 (2015) (on file with authors).
118. See, e.g., Microsoft Enterprise Agreement Amendment CTM01E68910, § 9
“Office 365 Security Terms,” Subsection (A) Privacy, at 11 (2013) (on file with authors).
119. For two important discussions of the relationship between privacy and
confidentiality, see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007), and Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving
Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763 (2014).
120. Motorola Solutions, Inc. Blanket Contract 2592, § 32, subsec. 8, at 14–15 (2011)
(on file with authors).
121. Coplogic, Inc. Blanket Contract 2708, § 35.2.1, at 21 (2010) (on file with
authors).

1950

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:3

information proprietary to that business.122 Where information is
designated confidential it may be subject to special protections by
agreement, including the prospect of an audit of the vendor to ensure they
are processing the information correctly.
Two agreements discussed internal measures to ensure that only the
vendor employees who need access to City data would have it—in general,
a best practice in consumer privacy. Microsoft committed that “Microsoft
personnel will not use, process, or disclose customer data without
authorization,” and further that “Microsoft personnel are obligated to
maintain the confidentiality of any customer data and this obligation
continues even after their engagement ends.”123 Volgistics, too, provided
that “Volgistics customer service employees will have access to customer
data as needed for the purpose of answering customer support inquiries,”
and also that “Volgistics accounting staff can only see part of your credit
card information.”124 No other contract we sampled limited internal access.
Quite a few agreements mentioned how long information would be
retained—a typical subject of privacy policies in the commercial context.
Retention terms varied, with longer retention generally framed as a selling
point. For example, Socrata, which manages the City’s open data portal,
advised it would retain City records for six years after the expiration or
termination of the agreement.125 Socrata also provides that it will keep the
data at the same geographic location unless the City authorizes a new
location in writing. Other contracts provided for the return of the data. For
example, Truven, a health analytics company, committed to “provide to the
City all City-owned data, property and deliverable . . . in the format
originally sent to the Vendor by the City or its Data Sources.”126
Other agreements discussed the conditions under which City data
would ever be shared with a third party. For the most part, the relevant
language committed the vendor to hold its subcontractors to the same
obligations the vendor has to the City. Language such as Oracle’s is
common: “Any subcontract made by Vendor shall incorporate by reference

122. Affirma Consulting, Agreement Number CRU 2013-002, § 22, subsec. G, at 11
(2013) (on file with authors).
123. See, e.g., Microsoft Enterprise Agreement Amendment CTM01E68910, § 9
“Office 365 Security Terms,” subsec. (A)(e), at 11 (2013) (on file with authors).
124. Volgistics is a company that offers software-based coordination of volunteers, of
which the City has many.
125. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, § 27 “Review of Vendor Records,” at 24
(2014) (on file with authors).
126. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, § 41.7.5 “Termination,” at 22 (2013).

2015]

PUSH, PULL, AND SPILL

1951

all the terms of this Contract . . . .”127 Confidential information, however
defined, sometimes enjoyed special protection against disclosure.
Several vendor agreements at least contemplated the possibility of
sharing with data with third parties. The Acyclica contract reserved the
right for the parties to renegotiate data ownership, “specifically with respect
to reselling of data,”128 whereas Truven required the City to opt out of
sharing its information with Truven’s MarketScan program and, in doing
so, give up the “MarketScan contribution discount.”129 We were unable to
determine whether the City decided to participate in MarketScan, and we
imagine the data would only be shared in the aggregate in any event.
A noteworthy feature of many of the contracts was the treatment of
privacy and security; many contracts did not explicitly address privacy
concerns by name even though they did so for security. Privacy and security
are both important abstractions governing the use of data but are
conceptually distinct enough to warrant separate analysis.
2. Security
One of the main concerns of stakeholders—in general, and specifically
in our study—is the adequacy of security around data. We are all aware of
major breaches affecting even the most sophisticated institutions. Security
is one of the venerated Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), which
the FTC and others use as a lodestar for privacy policy.130 A statement of
security practices is required for websites operating in California, as alluded
to above, and most states impose obligations on data custodians to notify
data subjects and the relevant authorities of a breach.131
The agreements we sampled and reviewed fared better on security than
privacy. Ten out of eighteen specifically reference the adequacy of data
security. Several called for security audits or else required vendors to provide
documentation of their security policies. Claims of security varied in
specificity. For instance, Parkeon simply states it will take “an appropriate
127. Oracle America, Inc. Blanket Contract 3025, § 13b, at 4 (2013).
128. Acyclica Attachment to the Western Systems Purchase Order, § 2.6.1, at 2 (on
file with authors).
129. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, exhibit B § 13(g), at 6 (2013) (on file with
authors).
130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-online
-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission.
131. Forty-seven states have laws on the books governing disclosure of data breaches.
For a current list see Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information
-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
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standard of due care,”132 whereas others offered specific benchmarks.
Motorola stated it would treat the city’s data as if it were their own, internal
data.133 PayByPhone pegged its standard to the robust Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard.134 And CopLogic offered an attestation
that a security auditor had tested its system for “common security
vulnerabilities.”135
Several companies dealt specifically with the important issue of
encryption, i.e., storing or communicating information in ways that would
ordinarily be unintelligible if accessed or intercepted by an unintended
party.136 Acyclica, a company that collects and processes traffic data,
promised that the City’s data would be “encrypted to fully eliminate the
possibility of identifying individuals or vehicles.”137 The health analytics
firm Truven specified 128-bit Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption of
some data.138 Volgistics also uses SSL for data in transit and storage.139
Finally, Microsoft uses encryption on data and media that is sent on public
networks or leaves its facilities.140 Acyclica, Truven, and Volgistics also refer
to the use of de-identification techniques separate from encryption.
Many states, including Washington, obligate companies that experience
data breaches to notify consumers and the authorities within a specified
time period.141 Regardless, parties are free to delineate additional, legally
132. Parkeon, Inc. Vendor Contract 1163, Attachment 1 § 5, at 7 (2004) (on file with
authors).
133. Motorola Solutions, Inc. Blanket Contract 2592, exhibit A “Data Information
Security Services,” at 5 (2011) (on file with authors).
134. PayByPhone Technologies, Inc. Vendor Contract 2992, § 13 Security, “Privacy
and Compliance,” at 5 (2015) (on file with authors).
135. CopLogic, Inc. Blanket Contract 2708 § 16 “Security,” at 12 (2010) (on file with
authors).
136. We presume many other vendors make routine use of encryption and simply do
not mention it.
137. Acyclica Attachment to the Western Systems Purchase Order, § 2.5.1, at 2. This
language is probably a little too strong. It may be possible for sophisticated parties to
identify people or objects even if encrypted, for instance, by breaking the encryption.
138. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, exhibit B § 15 “Data Communication,” at 6
(2013) (on file with authors).
139. Volgistics Online Form Security and Privacy Policies, “Security Policies,” at 2
(2015) (on file with authors).
140. EA Amendment CMT01E68910, § 9 “Office 365 Security Terms,” § (D)(a)(v)
4.A., at 14 (2013) (on file with authors). Microsoft encrypts Customer Data that is
transmitted over public networks; B. Microsoft restricts access to Customer Data in media
leaving its facilities (e.g., through encryption).
141. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010(1). Section 19.255.010(1) states:
Any person or business that conducts business in this state and that owns
or licenses computerized data that includes personal information shall
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consistent terms in the event of a security breach and often do so. In the
documents we analyzed, we noted that a few vendors committed to
notifying the City “immediately” (Socrata) or within one business day
(Parkeon).142
While state laws may obligate companies to disclose breaches, they do
not purport to delineate legal responsibility in the event of a breach.143 We
found that specific vendors attempted to contractually absolve themselves
of liability should a breach occur. This could occur generally through an
arbitration agreement (e.g., Tokusaku) or vendors could absolve liability
quite specifically in the event of a breach. For example, Socrata disclaims all
damages for loss of data, “whether or not resulting from acts of God,
communications failure, theft, destruction or unauthorized access to
Socrata’s records, programs, or services.”144 In contrast, still other vendors
(e.g., Hewitt and Microsoft), provide for credit monitoring or other “direct
damages” in the event of a breach. The City itself could be held accountable
consistent with sovereign immunity.145
3. Analysis
The agreements we reviewed were so-called “enterprise” agreements,
i.e., made between sophisticated parties. It would not necessarily be fair to
judge agreements between cities and firms against consumer privacy policies
or terms of use. Thus, we might not expect the agreements to exactly track
the Fair Information Practice Principles of notice, access, choice, and
security, or to adhere to the strictures of the California Online Privacy
Protection Act requiring every website to identify what data it collects and
disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of
this state whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.
Id.
142. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, subsec. 5.2.8, at 16 (2014) (on file with
authors); Parkeon Vendor Contract 1163, Attachment 1, sec. 5 “Security Standards,” at 7
(2004) (on file with authors).
143. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010(1).
144. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, subsec. 17, at 21 (2014) (on file with
authors).
145. See Kelso v. Tacoma, 390 P.2d 2 (Wash. 1964) (holding that the State of
Washington has waived sovereign immunity in tort cases and municipal sovereign
immunity); see also Locke v. City of Seattle, 172 P.3d 705 (2007). But see Cummins v.
Lewis County, 133 P.3d 458 (Wash. 2006) (holding that the public duty doctrine still
applies to the State of Washington). For a discussion of government liability in
Washington see Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State’s 45-Year Experiment
in Government Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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how it is used and safeguarded,146 even as we employ these standards as
benchmarks of best practice.
More so than an individual consumer, however, the City is in a position
to dictate the terms on which it will transact. Many of those terms—such
as adequate security—should apply in all of the City’s dealings around
resident or City data. What we most clearly observed in the vendor contracts
was a lack of standardization. The city reserves very disparate rights against
its various vendors, and receives a wide range of positive guarantees. Privacy
basics—such as notification requirements, security standards (including
encryption), and internal safeguards against unauthorized access—were not
specifically delineated in many instances. Companies like Volgistics and
Microsoft made extensive mention of privacy and security, laying out exact
terms. But other companies made almost no mention of these.
This reflects the status of cities as market makers, not market takers.
Law is not the only modality of regulation. Another is markets: cities can
and will drive business decisions because they are major potential customers.
An insistence that municipal vendors in the data space agree to basic
commitments around privacy and security can make city and citizen data
more secure all over the country by raising the market bar.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Article thus far has described the expectations around, and inner
workings of, Seattle’s open government initiative and other data processes.
A final section outlines some tentative recommendations on the basis of
what the team has learned. Though researched for the City of Seattle, the
practical nature of the seven recommendations shown in this section could
be considered valuable to any municipality seeking public trust, privacy, and
social justice on the road to open data.
A.

INVENTORY DATA ASSETS

Our first recommendation involves creating a complete inventory of
datasets, the fields within those datasets, and metadata explaining how the
information was collected, its purpose and use for the municipality, and any
other relevant descriptors concerning the proper management and
disposition of the data.
While much of this Article has focused on the contents of datasets, the
topic of metadata should not be ignored. Metadata can provide the
municipal organizations charged with governing data release with
146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014).
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information critical to understanding and hopefully acting within the
municipal and decidedly public context for the data.147
A common standard for metadata is the Dublin Core, a list of categories
useful for storing and classifying data. The fifteen fields that comprise the
core include: title, creator, subject, description, publisher, contributor, date,
type, format, identifier, source, language, relation, coverage, and rights.148
Amongst these categories are many fields for metadata that are potentially
valuable for storing, among other things, records that explain the purpose
of collecting the data on the part of the responsible department or office,
the public uses of the data, a description of the anticipated public benefits
of those uses, the classification of the data (e.g., sensitive, critical
infrastructure), the nature of the subjects, the sensitivities of the data,
restrictions on releases, requirements for aggregation prior to release,
suggested qualifications for note in exemption logs in reply to public
disclosure requests, a list of the third parties allowed access to the data, the
allowable uses or restrictions on use of the data by those third parties,
required security measures, applicable regulations, and a note explaining the
ex ante and ex post analyses of risk to privacy and social justice conducted
in relation to the distribution of the data.
Metadata includes field names. As our technical analysis highlights,
municipalities and their related government offices (i.e., counties, special
districts, states) should develop and share a data dictionary—a standardized
nomenclature for data fields and entries. This tool can provide multiple
efficiencies. It can assist departments and the public in interpreting and
using municipal data. Departments will find it easier to locate and identify
existing information. It can also reduce the chance that work would be
unnecessarily duplicated, as would occur if someone found it difficult to find
or properly interpret the datasets that already exist.
A more exact and shared naming convention can also reduce the time
and effort needed to determine the risk of harm in releasing datasets to the
public. In the case of our research, several of our technical strategies were
designed to simply deal with the fact that no shared lexicon currently exists
for the field names used by municipal departments. “Address” is just as likely
to appear as “ADDR,” “Street Address,” and “Location,” and the difference
creates unnecessary hurdles for ex ante analysis of risk of release. Any effort
147. For a definition of metadata, see KITCHIN, supra note 102, at 8.
148. See About Us, DUBLIN CORE METADATA INITIATIVE, http://dublincore.org (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (“The Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI) supports shared
innovation in metadata design and best practices across a broad range of purposes and
business models.”); Dublin Core Metadata Element Set, DUBLIN CORE METADATA
INITIATIVE (June 14, 2012), http://dublincore.org/documents/dces.
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that has to be spent to interpret the existing data is effort that could be saved
and spent elsewhere.
B.

REQUIRE EACH UNIT TO DEVELOP AND SUBMIT DATA POLICIES

For cities trying to thread the needle of protection for private and social
information while enjoying the ability to make other sets of data available
to the public, operating as a federated system has its benefits and its
drawbacks. Departments in a federated system will have a diversity of
strategies that have evolved to implement the policies they have each created
and tackle the problems they have each encountered. Revealing the
possibility to one department that they may emulate a practice in another
may be just the thing to assist departments. In Seattle, for example, some
departments appeared to be more comfortable than others sorting
meaningful from frivolous examples of public disclosure requests, and
denying requests with an explanation filed in their exemption log.
For Seattle, with newly adopted privacy principles, this is an opportune
time to learn about the variety of policies departments have already been
exercising that, whether they realized it or not, have had the effect of
preserving or compromising privacy and social equity. The Department of
Information Technology and the Mayor’s Office are intent on delivering a
citywide privacy policy. The successful implementation of such a policy will
depend on the ability of people in these departments to discern the degree
to which each department is already delivering practices that preserve
privacy and social equity, and to focus attention where it is needed to assist
departments that may feel overwhelmed by the shift in priorities.
Consider, in this light, the contrast in notice and consent provided to
the residents of Seattle from the Department of Transportation’s enlistment
of the services of Strava and Acyclica. One need not observe the presence of
a field name in a dataset to realize that the data can be used to identify
persons. As Montjoye et al. have shown, in their analysis of hourly
information flow from devices which record and track the movements of
people in time and space by keying in to the MAC address of personal
devices (similar to those deployed in Seattle), the traces of mobility left by
persons across the urban landscape are highly unique.149 With only four data
points observed in a day, 95% of MAC addresses and persons can be
identified. Within the spatial scale of a municipality the task of reidentification is further eased by the classification of municipal land use into
residential, office, and other forms of commercial space. Only one, or
149. See generally Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy
Bounds of Human Mobility, SCI. REP. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3607247/pdf/srep01376.pdf.
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perhaps two data points would be needed to identify most individuals: the
location at time of day when statistically likely to be in residence, and the
location at time of day when likely to be at school or work.
With these facts in mind, notice and consent would seem to be among
the prudent cautionary measures necessary for preserving public trust in the
privacy-preserving efforts of the Department. Strava’s application does not
capture the data flow of the entire population, and as an opt-in program the
data has limitations, yet it is data that participants agree to provide and it
has proven useful to the Department for the study of travel behavior.
Acyclica’s data covers more of the population and this fact is due to the lack
of notice, choice, and related attention to privacy that accompanied the
installation and contractual arrangements for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sniffers
in the public spaces around Seattle. The City can create and test new
avenues for notice, consent, and choice. People can opt-out of the program
if they are aware of it and capable of following the instructions to do so. The
City can also adopt more restrictive policies for permitting the distribution
of devices for surveillance in public space.
The next step for the City is to ask how important is the public use for
which this data is collected, and who should make this determination? If
the public use is deemed valuable enough to the taxpayer (including all
ancillary costs envisioned to make the data secure), the next question to ask
is how relevant this data is—in its entirety—to the public uses for which it
is collected. One can question the need for a sample of this size, the
frequency of the collection, the granularity and choice of spatial collection,
and of course, retention and distribution of the data. If used, for example,
for traffic operations on congested arterial streets, and such use is sanctioned
by the public or elected representatives, then the obvious condition that
should follow is the limitation of the spatial extent of collection. There is
no need for traffic operations to include the monitoring and evaluation of
travel behavior in the residential zones of the city, where the ease of
personally identifying individuals on the basis of time and location is most
likely. Like the black-out dates that airlines have employed to prevent the
use of discount travel during peak periods, municipalities should adopt
black-out zones, to prevent the use of personally identifying surveillance
technologies.
What these two cases suggest is also the extent to which a federated
system lends itself to an ad hoc approach to problems that are holistic in
nature, such as the problem of analyzing the potential privacy and social
equity harms involved in data releases. For this, a governance structure is
needed.
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ESTABLISH NESTED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Municipalities need structures to more effectively govern the releases of
data, via push, pull, and spill. They need governance structures that operate
on more than one level, that emulate the need to coordinate and provide
some hierarchy to the complex decisions that municipalities must make
through the release of data.
A nested governance structure could help municipalities develop
citywide policies and avoid ad hoc decision-making. Such a structure could
involve oversight from a municipal decision-making body analogous to an
Institutional Review Board (IRB), which are convened to review proposed
academic research involving human subjects. At the department level, such
a structure would include clear guidance about the types of activities that
would be exempt from review by the municipal IRB. The activities of
interest would span the life cycle of data, to collection, use, retention,
deletion, as well as release. Activities that are not exempt would be elevated
for review by the IRB.
Emphasizing the importance of informed, meaningful consent, Barocas
and Nissenbaum explain that notice and consent are most effectively refined
through the services of such a review board.150 In their explanation, they
borrow from the literature on human subject research in medicine, applying
these basic insights to the broader case of notice and consent for privacy.151
They acknowledge that patient interactions take place against a backdrop of
trust, and that consent or waiver should be interpreted narrowly. Quoting
O’Neill and Manson, they explain that obligations and expectations of
medical service providers are not discarded when patients consent. Consent
is requested of subjects in limited ways, for limited times and very specific
purposes.152 In consenting to an appendectomy, one does not consent to
other incisions, or to incisions by persons other than the relevant surgeon.
Furthermore, consent is not required for expected behaviors; it is required
for behaviors that depart from what is expected. The burden is on the
researcher or clinician to, in giving notice, “describe clearly the violations of
norms, standards, and expectations for which a waiver is being asked.”153 In
applying these insights to the more general problem of privacy amidst big
data, the authors suggest, “[a] burden is upon the collector and user of data
to explain why a subject has good reason to consent, even if consenting to

150.
151.
152.
153.

See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 97, at 64.
Id. at 44–75.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65.
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data practices that lie outside the norm. That, or there should be excellent
reasons why social and contextual ends are served by these practices.”154
In the case of Seattle, we have sought to illustrate the contextual
circumstances that surround the municipal rush to big data and open data.
Several departments are adopting technologies that collect rich datasets
about the people living and working in Seattle. Once collected, the data can
be subject to public disclosure request, and may be considered for release to
an open data portal. All of these activities can occur in ways that pay scant
attention to the potential effect on privacy or social justice from releases of
data. For example, the “8 Principles of Open Government Data,” used to
structure the review and release of business license data by the Departments
of Information Technology and Financial and Administrative Services,
were designed for the purposes of promoting the release of data. In this
system of reviewing and releasing data, there is no equivalent guidance in
practice to safeguard privacy and social justice.
The process of data review and release is devoid of the contextual and
subject-oriented privacy protection that Barocas and Nissenbaum define.
Practices to safeguard privacy and social justice are, in the current process,
reduced to the evaluation of individual fields within isolated datasets. Given
this, it is no wonder that public trust in the privacy-preserving actions of
municipalities remains suspect. We suggest the adoption of a municipal
IRB, tasked with protecting privacy and social justice, with the authority to
veto and condition the collection, use, and release of data, and the
interdisciplinary capability and experience to evaluate the public interest in
such decisions. Given the countervailing interests of open data and privacy,
it is worth mentioning that these aims should not be the responsibility of
the same person or division within a city department.
IRBs, however, are not needed in every case of review, and the
Department of Information Technology may seek to produce a list of
datasets and their fields that may be handled through administrative review
within the department that owns the data, or exempted from review
altogether. Municipal IRBs should be called into service only when the data
subjects are employees of the city, residents, or workers. The IRB can be
asked to review requests from departments for public release of data to
portals or online platforms and any accompanying supportive analysis, such
as an analysis of the nexus between the collection of the data, its public uses,
the interests of the taxpayer, and privacy and social justice implications. The
City should also consider using the IRB to evaluate public disclosure
requests that pose privacy or social justice problems, for which there are no
154. Id. at 67.
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clear exemptions in the PRA. This should result in recommendations
rendered on a case-by-case basis, yet informed by a body of knowledge of
preceding cases and their outcomes, as well as ongoing research in the
rapidly moving field of re-identification.
D.

ESTABLISH AND DISSEMINATE EX ANTE PROTOCOLS FOR PUSH,
PULL, AND SPILL

Cities should plan for the fact that departments may want to release data
by pushing it out to public portals when they should not or that departments
may inadequately act or invest to prevent the pull or spill of data. One
effective way to do this is to establish and disseminate protocols for
investigating datasets, in order to educate departments about how to
preserve privacy and social equity by curbing or curtailing certain types of
releases.
Our suggestions stem from our study of how multiple databases may be
joined after they have been published. Possibly the simplest approach a city
could take in a protocol to evaluate releases ex ante would be to
programmatically perform the same kinds of join strategies which our
research team did—and perhaps a few others that we did not have time to
develop. The join strategies would illustrate the overall joins made possible
with other public datasets (and private ones if available) if the proposed new
data were to be published. This method would result in two useful artifacts:
1. The resulting joined dataset, which could highlight
newly harmful combinations of data made possible with
the introduction of new data to the existing corpus of
publically available data.
2. A network map that shows precisely which fields would
be used to accomplish joins resulting in privacy harm.
The same method could be used to discover and eliminate existing
indexical fields, which cause the greatest degree of correlation across the
continuum of privacy related attributes in existing datasets. By adopting this
practice, and relying on as many existing datasets as possible, the City of
Seattle can reduce the likelihood of, and thus manage the risk associated
with, the joining of independent datasets in ways which may cause privacy
harm.
E.

CONDUCT PUBLIC RECORDS AUDIT AND TRAINING

We recommend based on the above that cities engage in audits and
training exercises whereby municipalities compare the text of state and
federal public records acts with what individual departments are doing on
the ground. In the case of Seattle, the City has protocols in place, by
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department, on how to respond to PRA requests. However, it is important
for all employees—not just those with responsibility for responding to
outside requests—to understand the law and the City’s interpretation of the
law. This will help reduce uncertainty and fear around the prospect of
abusive pulls or spills of employee data.
In our engagements with City employees, we noticed variation in the
understanding and application of public records requests. First, as noted,
not all departments adopted the same posture toward a request for
information. Parks and Recreation, which deals mostly with children and
families, adopted a relatively restrictive stance.155 The Police Department
had to come up with entirely novel procedures to accommodate massive
requests for information in the form of video recordings, and defaulted
toward sharing everything (with some modifications for privacy).
We also noticed that employees articulated fears about abusive behaviors
that should not have been possible under the text of the PRA. The act
provides an exception, for instance, for personal information about an
employee.156 Nevertheless, employees worried that other employees or the
public would gain access to information for the purposes of relationships,
bias, or embarrassment. When the PRA exception for employee personal
information was pointed out in an interview, the room erupted in laughter,
as if to suggest the exception would not be honored.157
This is not to say that any city should ignore the role of context—it may
be a good thing that departments do not all react identically to a request for
information. However, there should be some standardization. In particular,
all employees involved in responding to public records requests should know
the exceptions and the reasons behind them, and generally be able to fall
back on a clearly articulated policy.
F.

EXPLORE CONDITIONED ACCESS OF MUNICIPAL DATA

We recommend that cities explore vehicles by which to make certain
data available under specific conditions. This is a fairly common practice.
Companies, of course, routinely condition access to information on signing
a nondisclosure agreement. In the public sector, more than twenty states
condition access to voter databases on noncommercial use.158 Federal
155. Interview, Seattle Parks and Recreation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015).
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3) (2014) (“The following personal information
is exempt from public inspection and copying under this chapter: . . . Personal information
in files maintained for employees, appointees, or elected officials of any public agency to
the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy.”).
157. Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, WA (Mar. 9, 2015).
158. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.720(2). That section directs:
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election law has similar provisions. As cities open up more and more data,
they should consider whether one or more use restrictions would be
appropriate.
In our focus groups, several citizens and most privacy advocates
expressed concern over the prospect that the City would push data for
transparency reasons that would instead be used for commercial or political
purposes that were disadvantageous to consumers and citizens. Examples
included lenders writing off neighborhoods with respect to offers of credit
and politicians ignoring complaints from districts with low political
participation.159 There is ample evidence that municipal open data is a major
source for data brokers of all kinds.160 One opportunity might be to follow
the example of some states and federal agencies around political data and
condition access to certain data sets on noncommercial or
nondiscriminatory use. A government might do this when, for instance,
citizens may be less likely to participate in a given, beneficial activity such
as voting, donating, or volunteering because they fear it will lead them to be
targeted for marketing or otherwise cause them to face adverse commercial
consequences.
Another example might be conditioning access on the obligation to
update the information periodically. The issue here is that commercial
entities may copy databases that then become outdated, either because of a
mistake (false lien) or because of an update (juvenile record expunged).
Meanwhile, although the City now has the correct version, companies and
others may be making decisions on the basis of a copy in the hands of a data
broker. Presently nothing, apart from industry best practice, obligates these
data brokers to keep their databases up to date.
It should be noted that there are a number of pitfalls with this approach.
The first is that once data has been released, it is hard to follow. The City
The county auditor or secretary of state shall promptly furnish current
lists of registered voters in his or her possession, at actual reproduction
cost, to any person requesting such information. The lists shall not be
used for the purpose of mailing or delivering any advertisement or offer
for any property, establishment, organization, product, or service or for
the purpose of mailing or delivering any solicitation for money, services,
or anything of value. However, the lists and labels may be used for any
political purpose.
Id. For a summary of state-by-state codes on conditions pertaining to voter list access, see
Voter data use terms and conditions, NATION BUILDER, http://nationbuilder.com/voterdata;
see also Kim Zetter, For Sale: The American Voter, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2003), http://archive
.wired.com/politics/security/news/2003/12/61543?currentPage=all.
159. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015).
160. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9.
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might attach rules to its own data but it would have to think through what
happens downstream. Imagine, for instance, a condition that commercial
users of political data must certify that they will periodically update that
data. What if a noncommercial user—a political accountability nonprofit—downloads and reposts the data without restrictions? The City
would have to look for examples—for instance, in intellectual property
licensing—for language that follows the data.
The second is that recent Supreme Court precedent limits the sorts of
restrictions that governments can place on uses of data. In Sorrell v. IMS
Health, the Court invalidated Vermont’s attempt to restrict pharmaceutical
companies ability to use doctors’ prescribing history for marketing
purposes—a process called “detailing.”161 The Court found Vermont’s
attempt to prevent such targeting to be an unconstitutional restriction on
these companies’ speech.
Note that Vermont did not merely condition access to prescription
information on using it for a noncommercial purpose. It singled out
particular speakers to silence. According to the Court, “Vermont’s law
enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale disclosure, and
use of prescriber-identifying information.”162 Specifically, the Court found
that “the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers.”163 Thus, the Court concluded that the law ran afoul of
constitutional prescriptions of discriminating against viewpoints. Had the
state instead kept the data itself and released it only on the condition that it
not be used for commercial purposes, the Court might not have taken issue.
In general, there may be situations wherein the City wants some types of
commercial activities—such as the development of a helpful app by a forprofit start up—but would like to avoid others—such as profiling for
marketing. These sorts of restrictions are not likely to survive constitutional
scrutiny in light of Sorrell and other precedent.164
G.

DEVELOP STANDARD VENDOR AGREEMENT

We further recommend that the City of Seattle—and others, as well—
create a standard vendor agreement to use as a baseline in all future
contracting around City data. This agreement would lay out in clear and
simple language the obligations that the vendor takes on by virtue of its
custody over City data. These include:
161. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
162. Id. at 2663.
163. Id.
164. See id.; see also Discovery Networks v. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993)
(holding that governments may not ban speech merely on the basis that it is commercial).
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maintaining the confidentiality of data subjects;
restricting access to those within the organization that
need it;
 documenting basic digital and physical security;
 specific notification provisions in the event of a security
breach;
 specific delineation of responsibility and liability in the
event of a security breach; and
 obligations not to share data in any format absent the
express consent of the City and/or the data subject, or by
required operation of law.
The suggestion is not that the City would use the exact same agreement
in each instance. We recognize that department needs will vary on the basis
of the task. Moreover, there may be circumstances when the City or a
vendor will need to insist on differing terms. Rather, we recommend the
development of a baseline reference document such that any departure
would have to be specifically justified.
Models for such contracts already exist. For example, Microsoft has a
master service agreement around privacy and data security as part of its own
vendor toolkit.165 Moreover, there were specific contracts—in particular,
those of Volgistics and Microsoft—that contained much of the
recommended language already. And contracts can and do refer to preestablished standards of security such as PCI—which some vendors already
mention—and Internal Organization for Standardization and International
Electrotechnical Commission 27001 (“ISO 27001”) certification.
Ultimately drafting a model agreement may be a task best suited to
corporate counsel.
An ancillary, though important, benefit of a standardized vendor
agreement would be the effect on the overall market for municipal data.
Mid to large-size cities such as Seattle with big information needs and
access to considerable resources have the potential to be market-makers, i.e.,
to drive the market toward best practices in privacy and security. Our review
of vendor contracts suggests that, with exceptions, the market remains
immature in this respect. By insisting on a high bar, the City could not only
help justify the trust of stakeholders but improve the overall data ecosystem.
We would hope that the City would share any materials it developed with
other municipalities.
165. See Supplier Privacy Toolkit, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/
companyinformation/procurement/toolkit/en/us/requirements.aspx (last visited July 21,
2015).
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FUTURE WORK

This research was motivated by three central questions: does the City of
Seattle’s open data initiative increase the public trust in city government;
what kind of legal framing could the City use to capture the benefits of open
data while addressing legitimate privacy concerns; and what other kinds of
harms could arise from government release of data? This Article is a first
step, and much work remains to be done.
This case study points toward promising future work in the area of open
data research for municipalities and other related governmental entities.
Among the research questions raised, we highlight the following:
Municipalities exist to represent and serve the public, and their
departments and offices generally share a keen interest in providing benefits
to the taxpayer, in the form of efficiencies as well as public goods. If open
data does indeed provide taxpayers with an efficient vehicle for transparency
and accountability, then there is no reason to question the validity of the
movement to open data. And yet, the activities the City recorded in data
collection and released for public and perhaps commercial uses were just as
likely to focus on residents as they were the government. What public good
is served when the names of people given building code violations are made
public? What service is improved by publicizing the names of people
applying to participate in pea-patch gardening projects? What is the public
benefit of tracking the movements of people through their devices across
the neighborhoods of the city? In a more striking case, consider police bodyworn video. The shocking videos of shootings that raise public attention
toward the activities of police capture, often in full view, the officer as well
as the suspect. We are shocked in witnessing, during the course of the video,
how a suspect becomes a victim. When the body worn video (recorded on
cameras that face forward from the chest or shoulder of the officer) provide
little more than moving pictures of the residents of the city, one has to ask
whether this technology genuinely serves the purposes of transparency and
accountability. If the electric eye is observing only one of these parties, what
purposes does this fulfill?
If we presume that the rationale for data collection and use is valid, then
the question of efficiency comes into focus. As Aaron Wildavsky has noted,
efficiency does not tell you where to go, only that you should arrive there
with the least effort.166 On the grounds of efficiency one could question
whether the use of advanced information technology—with sensors that
detect, discern, and develop thick flows of information in real-time—
delivers on its promise of efficiency to the taxpayer. What is the empirical
166. AARON B. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 131 (1989).
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evidence that big municipal data collection followed by big data releases (or
big exemptions from releases by State Legislatures), pushed, pulled or
spilled, make the City more efficient? When public representatives adopt
open data policies, releasing data to the wild, we shift the rules of the game
by making private information public. What are the full economic
consequences, and how are they distributed amongst the public (who are
often the subjects of the data), commercial firms (who often request access
to the data about public subjects) and the municipality (whose aim it is to
represent the public interest)? What are the distributional consequences—
does release heighten or relieve the public of its oft-laden position at the
lower end of information asymmetry?
The push, pull, and spill of data from municipalities can predispose the
general public and public employees to harms of privacy and social equity.
With what legal framework might cities be capable of remedying these
harms, and navigating the contested space of data control and release? Much
in the case of Seattle may hinge on legal frameworks established by the
selective intervention of special interests (public and private) in the adoption
of exemptions to the Washington State PRA at the state level, in addition
to various privacy-facing federal acts, such as HIPAA. Selective
intervention in the rules of the game of state disclosure law suggest that the
existing legal framework for balancing privacy and open data is somehow
flawed, and this doubt is redoubled through empirically powerful
examinations of the inability to use existing legal frameworks—predicated
on achieving anonymity by replacing or redacting PII—to protect
information that people prefer to keep private. What legal remedies exist,
and if they were more widespread, would they be sufficient? What remedies
should exist, and how will we know when they are effective?
We’ve said a lot here; clearly, there is more to be said on the subject.

